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CHOICE OF LAW AND SOFTWARE
LICENSES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
DISCUSSION
Kathleen Patchel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As intellectual property becomes an increasingly important
commodity in international transactions, the choice-of-law
principles applied to determine the substantive law that will
govern this type of international contract become increasingly
important as well. Most current choice-of-law regimes were not
designed with software licensing in mind, or, in the United
States, even primarily with international transactions in
mind.' It thus seems important to ask what are the appropriate rules for selecting the law applicable to the contractual
aspects of the licensing of software? Are the choice-of-law rules
that govern other contracts appropriate for application to licenses, or are there differences between contracts in which
software is the commodity versus goods and services that
should lead to different choice-of-law rules?
This Article suggests a framework for thinking about these
issues, grounded in consideration of the interests affected by
choice-of-law rules, the way in which various choice-of-law
rules reflect those interests, and the nature of intellectual
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Law-Indianapolis. Thanks to my colleague Professor Kenneth Crews for his very
helpful comments on the draft of this Article.
1. As Professor Mathias Reimann has noted:
The paradigmatic American conflicts case is an interstate affair. The
modern approaches to personal jurisdiction and choice of law have thus
been developed in the domestic context and for use in a federal system.
For decades, American conflicts law almost completely neglected the international dimension. Even since American courts and scholars occasionally began to consider it, the international scene continues to be treated
as a side show that requires merely minor modifications of homespun
rules.
MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAW IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH

THE JUNGLE 19 (1995) (citations omitted). The domestic orientation of U.S. conflict
of laws is in sharp contrast with the European approach. Because in most European countries, even those like Germany that have a federal structure, the court
systems, private law and procedure are by and large nationally uniform, "conflicts
issues involve, almost by definition, two or more nations." Id. at 20.
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property. Part II identifies and briefly discusses the most important interests to be taken into account in structuring a
system of choice-of-law rules. Part III discusses how some of
the most important choice-of-law methodologies balance these
interests. Part IV then considers whether there are characteristics peculiar to software licensing that should be taken into
account in formulating contractual choice-of-law rules that
provide an appropriate balancing of interests in this area.
Finally, Part V analyzes the choice-of-law provision in section
109 of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) in terms of the framework previously established.
In developing this framework, the focus is on software
transactions-the paradigm transaction is a license of software, and the paradigm intellectual property regime is copyright. In addition, the focus on choice-of-law rules is limited to
choice-of-law rules of the United States and the European
Union.
II. INTERESTS IMPACTED BY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
Three distinct sets of interests are affected by a forum's
choice-of-law rules: (1) the concerns of the parties to the transaction; (2) the concerns of jurisdictions that have an interest in
the substantive law that will apply to the transaction; and, (3)
the concerns of the system of jurisdictions among which the
choice-of-law rules will operate.
A.

Concerns of Partiesto a Multi-JurisdictionalTransaction

The parties to a multi-jurisdictional transaction have the
most obvious interest-in terms of immediacy and visibility-in the choice-of-law rules that will be applied to select the
law that will govern their relationship. Party concerns that
must be considered in developing choice-of-law rules include:
(1) certainty and predictability, (2) protection of party expectations, (3) fairness, (4) freedom to select substantively favorable
law, and, (5) uniformity of application.
1. Certainty and Predictability
A primary concern of the parties to a multi-jurisdictional
transaction is certainty and predictability as to the law that
will govern the transaction. This is particularly true with re-
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gard to contractual relationships, which as planned transactions, may involve reliance on the application of particular
legal rules in order to effectuate the parties' agreement.2 The
clearer the choice-of-law rule that applies, the less transaction
costs the parties will have in determining the validity and
legal consequences of their contract.
2. Party Expectations as to the Applicable Law
Protection of the parties' expectations is a second concern.
Parties are likely to have expectations about the law that will
govern their contract and may act in reliance on those expectations.' Although this concern is related to the concern about
certainty and predictability, the two are distinct: a choice-oflaw rule could be very clear, but nevertheless point to the law
of a jurisdiction the application of which would not be consistent with the expectations of one or both of the parties.4

2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(f) (1971)
(listing "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" as factors relevant to
choice of the applicable rule of law) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
OF LAWS]; Id. § 187 cmt. e (noting that "[pirime objectives of contract law are to
protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract").
3. See, e.g., id. § 6(2)(d) (listing "the protection of justified expectations" as a
factor relevant to choice of the applicable rule of law). Comment g to section 6
states that protection of justified expectations
is an important value in all fields of the law, including choice of law.
Generally speaking, it would be unfair and improper to hold a person
liable under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded
his conduct to conform to the requirements of another state.
Id. § 6 crat. g. Cf. Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution,
71 IND. L.J. 271, 286 (1996) ("A party may be protected from the choice of unfavorable law if the party reasonably and to his detriment relied on the application
of favorable law. The policy justifying this-variously termed party expectations,
avoidance of unfair surprise, or foreseeability-is well accepted in conflicts theory.").
4. The clarity of the choice-of-law rule, of course, would be relevant in determining whether the expectations were "justified" or "reasonable," qualifications that
may be relevant in determining the weight to be given to expectation concerns in
the overall balance of interests for purposes of formulating choice-of-law rules. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. g.
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3. Fairness
The fairness of applying the law selected by the choice-oflaw rule is a third concern. Again, this concern is closely related to, but distinct from, concerns of certainty and predictability
and protecting party expectations. One can argue that it is fair
to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction because it was
clear under applicable choice-of-law rules that it would apply.
One can also argue that it is fair to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction because the parties should have expected that
law to apply, for example, because of the nature of the parties'
contacts with that jurisdiction.5 One can also argue, however,
that it is fair to apply a particular law because the substance
of the law is such that it does the parties no harm. Fairness, in
other words, is an amorphous concept, but is clearly an important choice-of-law consideration for the parties to a multi-jurisdictional transaction.
4. Freedom to Select Substantively Favorable Law
A fourth concern that parties to planned transactions may
have is the ability to pick a substantively favorable law to
govern the transaction. A party might want to be assured that
a particular law would apply, for example, because its rules
would give her an advantage in the transaction not available
under other law. A law also might be viewed as substantively
favorable by the parties because it is well-developed with regard to the subject matter of their contract, because it is a law
with which they are familiar, and/or because it is viewed by
both parties as "neutral" in not unduly favoring either party.6

5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 6
cmt. g (tying fairness to justified expectations of the parties).
. See, e.g., id. § 187 cmt. f (discussing the rationale for allowing parties to
choose the law of an unrelated jurisdiction, if the parties have a reasonable basis
for the choice). Comment f states:
The parties to a multistate contract may have a reasonable basis for
choosing a state with which the contract has no substantial relationship.
For example, when contracting in countries whose legal systems are
strange to them as well as relatively immature, the parties should be
able to choose a law on the ground that they know it well and that it is
sufficiently developed. For only in this way can they be sure of knowing
accurately the extent of their rights and duties under the contract. So
parties to a contract for the transportation of goods by sea between two
countries with relatively undeveloped legal systems should be permitted
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This concern again is related to the concern about certainty
and predictability because, to the extent choice-of-law rules are
clear, the parties may be able to structure their transaction in
a way that causes the choice-of-law rules to point to the jurisdiction with substantively favorable law. The concern, however, is an independent one because a choice-of-law rule that
provides certainty and predictability might also operate to
exclude the possibility of selecting the law viewed as favorable
by one or both of the parties.
5. Uniformity in Application
Finally, the parties have a concern that application of
choice-of-law rules be uniform, both within a particular forum
and among the potential fora.7 Parties who have relied on the
application of a particular law in structuring their deal will be
concerned that the choice-of-law rules actually applied in the
event of a dispute are those that they assumed would be applicable, and that those rules are applied in a fashion consistent
with the way they have been applied by that forum in the past.
As with the other concerns discussed, this interest is related to
the interest in certainty and predictability-the parties cannot
be assured certainty and predictability unless the rules they
have assumed would apply are in fact applied to their transaction, and are applied as they have been in the past. Conversely, choice-of-law rules sufficiently clear to allow the parties to
predict with an acceptable degree of certainty what law will
apply to their transaction also are likely to be those most capable of consistent application.
The concern of uniform application among potential fora
also protects the parties from forum-shopping.8 If the parties'
transaction leads to litigation, the choice-of-law rules applied
will be those of the forum.9 Thus, by selecting the forum in

to submit their contract to some well-known and highly elaborated commercial law.
Id.
7. See, e.g., id. § 6(2)(f) (listing "uniformity of result" as a factor relevant to
choice of the applicable rule of law).
8. See id. § 6 cmt. i (noting that uniformity of choice-of-law rules discourages
forum shopping).
9. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.1, at 49 (2d
ed. 1992).
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which to file suit, the party who initiates court action also
chooses-at least initially-the applicable choice-of-law rules.
In the absence of some argument that allows her to change the
forum-such as forum non conveniens or an enforceable choice
of forum clause-the defendant thus is subject to the choice-oflaw rules picked by the plaintiff. If the available fora have
different choice-of-law rules, which are likely to lead to the
application of different substantive law, those differences may
become a factor in the plaintiffs choice of forum.
Although it might be argued that uniform choice-of-law
rules across potential fora are primarily a concern of the defendant, in fact, at the time the transaction is entered, they will
be an important concern of both parties. First, at that point,
the desire for certainty and predictability as to applicable law
will be more important to both parties than the ability to second-guess the applicable substantive rules in the event of litigation. At this stage, the parties are much more likely to be
focused on effectuating their agreement than on gaining a
strategic advantage in the event their deal falls apart. Further,
at the time the transaction is entered into, neither party is
likely to know with any degree of certainty whether she will be
the plaintiff or the defendant in any ensuing litigation, and,
thus, whether she will benefit from the ability to forum shop
with regard to choice-of-law rules. Finally, even at the litigation stage, the plaintiff cannot be sure that nonuniform choiceof-law rules will work to her advantage. The plaintiffs choice
of forum may very well be dictated by concerns other than
choice-of-law rules, such as the presence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the convenience of the forum, and the
potential enforceability of any judgment obtained there. Therefore, even from the perspective of litigation strategy, the plaintiff as well as the defendant may benefit from uniform choiceof-law rules that neutralize choice of law as a consideration in
choice of forum.
6. Planning Concerns Versus Fairness Concerns
As the above discussion illustrates, parties to multi-jurisdictional transactions have an important set of distinct, although interrelated, interests that must be taken into account
in structuring a choice-of-law regime. These concerns, however,
are not of uniform importance to all parties in all multi-juis-
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dictional transactions or even, in many instances, to both parties to the same multi-jurisdictional transaction. Thus, a
framework for analyzing choice-of-law regimes in terms of the
balance they strike between competing interests must take
into account the fact that the concerns of the parties may conflict with each other, as well as with the concerns of interested
jurisdictions and the system as a whole. Party interests often
will need to be balanced against each other as well as against
these other interests in formulating a choice-of-law regime.
The parties' interests can be divided into roughly two
types: (1) planning-related concerns, which focus primarily on
the parties' ability to plan their transactions in an efficient and
effective manner; and, (2) fairness-related concerns, which
focus on the fairness of applying the substantive law chosen by
the choice-of-law rules." Party interests that focus primarily
on planning-related concerns are: (1) certainty and predictability; (2) freedom to select substantively favorable law; and, (3)
uniformity of application. The primary focus of the interests in
(1) protection of party expectations, and (2) fairness, is with
the fairness of the application of a-particular substantive law.
The extent to which these various interests are important
to the parties to a contract depends on the nature of the transaction in which those parties are engaged. Planning-related
interests obviously are of primary importance to parties who
are concerned about being able to plan their transactions in
light of the application of a particular body of law. As Professor
Bill Woodward has demonstrated in a slightly different context, this group is considerably less than all contracting parties." In many transactions it is inefficient for at least one of
the parties to the transaction to incur the time and expense
necessary to become sufficiently informed about the content of
potentially applicable laws for choice of law to become a salient
point in that party's contracting considerations. 2 On the other hand, it is efficient for the parties to take choice-of-law con-

10. This is only a rough division because, as the above discussion illustrates,
although each of the concerns has distinct aspects, they are interrelated, and,
therefore, may, in a given situation, serve both planning and fairness functions.
11. William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening
Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 243 (1997).
12. See id. at 261.
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siderations into account in planning their transaction when
either: (1) the size of the transaction justifies the expenditure;
or, (2) the party is a "repeat player," engaging in a number of
similar transactions, so that the costs can be spread over all of
the transactions."3
Based on this analysis, those of the interests discussed
above that can be described as primarily planning concerns
may be very important to a repeat player or to the parties to a
large transaction, but of little or no importance to someone
engaged in a small, one-time licensing transaction. Thus, for
example, if one is entering into a large, multinational licensing
transaction, the ability to choose a well-developed, neutral law
may be an important factor. If on the other hand, one is purchasing one piece of mass-market software off the shelf from a
company that is the national of another country, choice-of-law
considerations are unlikely to be a conscious part of the decision to purchase. Choice-of-law rules often will become a significant issue for one-shot parties engaged in small transactions
only after the fact, once litigation is imminent. For one-shot
parties, then, the more important concerns are likely to be
party expectations and fairness considerations.
This is not to say that party expectations and fairness
considerations are not important as well to those for whom it
is efficient to engage in choice-of-law planning. For parties for
whom it is efficient to plan, however, those concerns need not
be of primary importance. The interrelatedness of the various
party concerns means that these concerns will be addressed for
those parties indirectly by choice-of-law rules that value their
planning-related interests. For one-shot parties, however, those
concerns will be a more important focus, and their interests
will be served more effectively by choice-of-law rules that value
those interests directly.
B.

Concerns of InterestedJurisdictions

A second group of interests that choice-of-law rules should
take into account are those of jurisdictions within the multi-jurisdictional system that have an interest in which substantive
law is applied. 4 State interests implicated by choice-of-law

13. See id. at 265-66.
14. The word "interest" here is used in a general sense, to denote some rea-
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rules include: (1) an interest in controlling activities within the
state's territory; (2) an interest in furthering the state's policy
determinations; (3) an interest in protecting the state's citizens
and domiciliaries; and, (4) an interest in controlling the use of
the state's judicial resources. Normally these concerns form the
basis for a claim to application of the jurisdiction's law to the
transaction, 5 although this is not inevitably the case.
1. Territorial Interests
One concern of interested jurisdictions is a territorial interest-the interest of a sovereign in controlling activities that
take place within its borders."6 Sovereignty is most commonly
defined in terms of control over a geographical area; therefore,
a core aspect of sovereignty is the ability to control activities
occurring within the sovereign's borders.'7 Choice-of-law rules
that apply the law of one jurisdiction to transactions occurring
within the borders of another jurisdiction implicate this interest.

son why a state cares about the choice-of-law decision, and not as a term of art
associated with governmental interest analysis. Under interest analysis, "state
interest" is limited to an interest of the state in applying its own law, and exists
only if the purposes underlying that state's law would be furthered by its application. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.6, at 15-20 (discussing Brainard
Currie's governmental interest theory).
15. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1206, 1208 (1998) (noting that "in modern times a transaction can legitimately be
regulated by the jurisdiction where the transaction occurs, the jurisdictions where
significant effects of the transaction are felt, and the jurisdictions where the parties burdened by the regulation are from").
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, §

188(2)(a)-(d) (listing the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of
performance, and the location of the subject matter of the contract, as contacts to
be considered in determining the applicable law); id. cmt. e (noting inter alia the
"obvious interest" of the state of performance in "the nature of the performance
and the party who is to perform" and the "natural interest" of the state in which
the subject matter is located in "transactions affecting it."); REIMANN, supra note
1, at 23 (discussing the influence of territorialism on European conflicts rules). Cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(1)(a)-(b) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWI (stating

that a state has legislative jurisdiction over "conduct that, wholly or in substantial
part, takes place within its territory" and over "the status of persons, or interest
in things, present within its territory").
17. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 16, § 201 (de-

fining a state as "an entity that has a defined territory and permanent population,
under the control of its own government").
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2. Enforcement of State Policies
Sovereigns also have an interest in enforcing the policy
determinations reflected in their laws. 8 This interest is related to the state's territorial interest-because of the basically
territorial definition of sovereignty, a sovereign has the strongest claim to enforcing the policy determinations reflected in
its laws within its own jurisdiction. The sovereign, however,
may have an interest in enforcing its policy determinations
outside its geographical borders because of the effect of extraterritorial activities on those policies. 9
3. Protection of Citizens and Domiciliaries
Sovereigns also have an interest in protecting their citizens and domiciliaries. ° Membership in a particular polity
presumptively carries with it the protection of that sovereign.
The actions of nationals of a sovereign can reflect upon the
sovereign, and the treatment of an individual by other sovereigns can be viewed as a measure of the respect given to the
sovereign of which the individual is a national.2 '

18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, §
6(2)(b)(c) (listing "the relevant policies of the forum" and "the relevant policies of
other interested states" as factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of
law); id& cmt. e ("If the purposes sought to be achieved by a local . . . rule would
be furthered by its application to out-of-state facts, this is a weighty reason why
such application should be made"); id. cmt. f ("In determining a question of choice
of law, the forum should give consideration not only to its own relevant policies . . . but also to the relevant policies of all other interested states . . . . In
general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are most deeply affected should
have its local law applied.").
19. Cf RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 16, § 402(1)(c)
(recognizing the effects of extraterritorial behavior within a jurisdiction as a basis
for the exercise of legislative jurisdiction).
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, §
188(2)(e) (listing "the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties" as contacts to be considered in determining the
applicable law); REIMANN, supra note 1, at 21-23 (discussing the influence of domicile and citizenship on European conflicts law).
21. Cf RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 16, § 402(2) (recognizing the legislative jurisdiction of a nation to regulate extraterritorial conduct of
a national or domiciliary); id. § 402 cmt. g (suggesting that a nation may have
power in certain limited situations to regulate certain extraterritorial acts against
its citizens).

2000]

CHOICE-OF-LAW FRAMEWORK

127

4. Control of Judicial Resources
Sovereigns also have an interest in controlling the use of
their judicial resources. The primary function of the sovereign's
judicial system is to enforce and interpret its own laws. Thus,
the sovereign has an interest in controlling the extent to which
those judicial resources are used to enforce the laws of other
jurisdictions.2 2
As with the various interests of the parties, the interests
of jurisdictions may conflict with each other. One jurisdiction's
interest in controlling acts within its borders may conflict with
another jurisdiction's interest in controlling the effects of extraterritorial activity. Similarly, a jurisdiction's interest in avoiding the use of its judicial resources to enforce foreign law it
views as substantively offensive will clash with another
jurisdiction's interest in enforcing the policy determinations
reflected in its law. It is this clash of various sovereign interests, of course, that puts the "conflict" into conflict of laws.
Thus, choice-of-law rules must not only balance jurisdictions'
interests against party and systemic interests, but also against
each other.
C. Systemic Interests
The system of jurisdictions in which choice-of-law rules
operate also has a group of concerns that must be taken into
account in structuring those rules. Indeed, one can argue that
the primary raison d'etre of choice of law is to further these
interests. In the absence of any higher authority, the decision
to apply a law other than that of the forum is always made by
the forum itself. The recognition of other law is thus a recognition of the interests of other jurisdictions, grounded in systemic concerns. For example, the comments to the Second
Restatement state:
Probably the most important function of choice-of-law rules is
to make the interstate and international systems work well.

22. This interest is reflected not only in certain choice-of-law rules, such as
public policy exceptions, but in other doctrines, such as forum non conveniens. In
the United States, a state's ability to deny access to its courts for adjudication
under the laws of other United States jurisdictions is limited by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 980 (1951), and the Supremacy
Clause, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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Choice-of-law rules, among other things, should seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate
commercial intercourse between them. In formulating rules of
choice of law, a state should have regard for the needs and
policies of other states and of the community of states. Rules
of choice of law formulated with regard for such needs and
policies are likely to commend themselves to other states and
to be adopted by these states. Adoption of the same choice-oflaw rules by many states will further the needs of the interstate and international systems and likewise the
values of
2
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.
Systemic interests include: (1) an interest in certainty and
predictability in choice-of-law rules; (2) a need for mutual cooperation in deciding what substantive law should govern particular transactions; (3) mutual respect for the law of other jurisdictions; and, (4) uniform application of choice-of-law rules.
1. Certainty and Predictability
The parties to multi-jurisdictional transactions have an
interest in certainty and predictability with regard to the
choice-of-law rules applied in order to allow them to plan
transactions in reliance on the application of a particular law.
Certainty and predictability as to the applicable choice-of-law
rules also is an important systemic interest. To the extent that
the system as a whole has accepted choice-of-law rules that
clearly allocate competence to apply law among the various
jurisdictions, conflicts between the various jurisdictions can be
avoided.
2. Mutual Respect
Mutual respect is a second concern of the conflicts system
as a whole. Different sovereigns within the system are likely to
have dealt with the same issues through substantive laws that
reflect different approaches and different balancing of relevant
interests. Respect for the differing policy decisions of other
jurisdictions in deciding which law will apply to which transac-

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 6 cmt. d. Section 6 of the Second Restatement lists "the needs of the interstate and international systems" as one of the factors relevant to the choice of applicable law. Id. §
6(2)(a).
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tions is an important concern in allowing the jurisdictions
within the system to encourage reciprocity and avoid retaliation. Respect for the laws of other jurisdictions encourages
allocation of competency to deal with particular issues in a
manner acceptable to all interested jurisdictions because that
allocation sufficiently takes into account their interests.
3. Mutual Cooperation
Mutual cooperation in the application of choice-of-law
rules to determine the substantive law that will apply to a
multi-jurisdictional transaction is perhaps the most important
systemic concern. At least in the absence of some overarching
authority, every sovereign theoretically could apply its own law
to every transaction that otherwise came within its jurisdiction. Such parochialism, of course, would be the antithesis of a
choice-of-law system, and the retaliatory actions that such a
policy would invite from other interested jurisdictions whose
concerns were ignored would lead to intense forum-shopping
and a balkanization of legal regimes that ultimately would
work to the detriment of the interests of both the parties to
multi-jurisdictional transactions and the individual jurisdictions. It is the recognition of the need for mutual cooperation
in order to avoid these consequences that leads to the development of workable choice-of-law systems.
4. Uniformity of Application
Just as the parties to multi-jurisdictional transactions
have a concern for uniform application of choice-of-law rules in
order to preserve in fact the certainty and predictability that
clear choice-of-law rules offer in theory, the jurisdictions within
a choice-of-law system have an interest in uniformity in order
to preserve in fact the allocation of substantive law competence
represented by a system of choice-of-law rules to which they
have agreed. Uniform, good faith application of choice-of-law
rules adopted by a group of jurisdictions is the final step in
achieving a workable choice-of-law system.'

24. The absence of such a good faith, uniform application of the putatively
uniform rules of the First Restatement was a major contribution to its demise as
a workable set of rules to govern choice-of-law determinations within the United
States.
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5. The Nature of the System
The nature and strength of these systemic interests vary
with the nature of the system. Among states of the United
States, for example, the relative weight placed on the values of
mutual respect and cooperation in the development of choiceof-law rules has been shaped by the existence of constitutional
restraints on the extent to which one state can impose upon
the jurisdiction of another.' The decision as to the importance of these values in the system has been determined for
the members of the system as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Further, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the constitutional constraints on a state's ability to apply
its own law are quite minimal," states within the United
States need not give much consideration to these values in
developing their choice-of-law rules. Not only do they have an
explicit and generous standard as to how far they can go in
applying their own law at the expense of other interested jurisdictions, but the only consequence of crossing the line in a
particular case is likely to be the overruling of a judicial decision on constitutional grounds.
In contrast, in an international system there is no
overarching legal authority that imposes limits on each individual nation's freedom of action in imposing its laws or refusing to recognize the laws of other jurisdictions.2 7 This lack of

25. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 30.
26. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)
("for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible man-

ner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair") (plurality opinion); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 821 (1985) (state cannot apply its substantive law to claims with regard
to which it has no interest). See generally Shreve, supra note 3, at 271 (discussing
the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to develop constitutional limits on choice of law
to protect nonforum state interests and nonforum litigants from parochial state
conflicts decisions).
27. See REJMANN, supra note 1, at 32-33. European integration, however, ultimately may provide at least some external limits on the application of choice of
law in Europe. For example, the Treaty of Rome contains guarantees of certain
fundamental rights and freedoms that might form the basis of restrictions on
member countries in applying their choice-of-law rules to disputes involving parties
from member states. See id. at 32-33. Similarly, in the area of contract, adoption
of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980
O.J. (L 266) 1 [hereinafter Rome Convention], means that the choice-of-law rules
regarding contractual obligations now are substantially identical throughout the
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a higher authority means that jurisdictions within an international system have both greater freedom to ignore the interests
of other states, and greater incentives to exercise self-restraint
in doing so, than do states within the United States. Because
jurisdictions in an international conflicts system must make
their choice-of-law determinations without the benefit of express legal standards as to the outer bounds of conduct acceptable to the system as a whole, and without the assurance that
if they push the limits the repercussion will be minimal, their
choice-of-law decisions must involve political calculations about
the extent to which they can ignore the interests of other jurisdictions in the system and the likelihood that doing so will
lead to retaliation. Thus, the absence of constraints counsels
restraint in choice-of-law decisions and "creates a persistent
need for cooperation."'
Similarly, the existence of a common culture within the
U.S. choice-of-law system minimizes the diversity of the rules
potentially applicable to interstate disputes. As a result, a
jurisdiction applying interstate choice-of-law rules has both
less reason to avoid the application of the law of another U.S.
jurisdiction because of its diversity, and a better argument for
applying its own law to the detriment of other interested jurisdictions because the substantive differences between the laws
are less obvious.29 On the other hand, the greater diversity of
cultures at the international level means that laws are likely
to reflect more diverse values, and thus, to present both a
stronger temptation to avoid application of foreign law, and
bring into prominence the need to respect differing solutions to

European Union. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 93.
28. REIMANN, supra note 1, at 34.
When constitutional constraints are absent, pushing the limits at one's
neighbors' (or its citizen') expense is perilous because it invites retaliation
and can cause escalation to which there is no guaranteed end. Western
European Countries have long recognized that in such a situation they
depend on restraint being exercised by all countries involved, and that
partnership is in the best interest of everyone.
Id. at 34-35.
29. In this regard, consider Sun Oil, Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), in
which the Supreme Court affirmed a forum court's interpretation of another state's
law as producing results similar to those its own law would produce, stating "it is
not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather . . .
that misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that is clearly established . . . ." Id

at 730-31.
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similar issues. 0
III. CHOICE-OF-LAW
REFLECT

THEORIES

AND

THE

POLICIES

THEY

The previous discussion focused on the various interests
affected by choice-of-law rules. The assumption of that discussion was that the particular choice-of-law rules adopted by a
jurisdiction represent a particular balancing of these interests.
This section examines some of the more widely-accepted
choice-of-law rules in light of that assumption, and discusses
the particular balancing of interests that those rules reflect.
The discussion focuses on five types of choice-of-law rules: (1)
multilateral or jurisdiction-selecting rules; (2) the center of
gravity approach; (3) choice of law by contract; (4) mandatory
rules; and, (5) public policy exceptions. There obviously are
many other possible choice-of-law rules.3 These particular
rules were selected for analysis because of their wide acceptance not only in the United States, but in the international
context, and, particularly, in Western Europe.

30. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 27.
In the unity of the domestic [U.S.) legal culture, there is seldom a good
reason to invoke [public policy to avoid application of offensive substantive law of another U.S. jurisdiction], while in the diversity of rules and
values on the international level, the escape devise constantly beckons.
Id. On the other hand, Professor Reimann states that, in light of the greater
temptation at the international level to avoid the application of foreign law, European scholars and courts "have developed sophisticated rules about the application
and the limits of the public policy exception," the choice-of-law device that would
allow a forum to avoid the application of the substantive law otherwise designated
by the forum's choice-of-law rules on the basis that it is substantively offensive to
the forum. Id.
31. Conspicuously absent from this discussion, for example, is Professor
Brainard Currie's governmental interest analysis approach to choice of law, and
the variations on that doctrine developed by other conflicts scholars. For a summary of these doctrines, see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, §§ 2.6, 2.8, at 15-20, 2326. While the "interest analysis" idea has its roots in earlier European conflicts
scholarship, see id. § 2.6, at 15, and Professor Currie's ideas have had a considerable influence on the development of U.S. choice-of-law theory in the latter half of
this century, this analysis does not appear to be at the forefront of current choiceof-law theory widely adopted outside of the United States.
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Multilateralismor Jurisdiction-SelectingRules
Multilateralism focuses on selecting one jurisdiction within

a community of jurisdictions that will have competence to
decide a particular type of issue in all situations. Under this
approach, broad categories of legal transactions are linked to a
given territory by connecting factors. In the United States, the
FirstRestatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws is an example
of this approach.3 2 The First Restatement provides, for example, that the law of the place of contracting determines issues
relating to the validity of the contract (such as capacity to
contract, formalities, and assent)" while the law of the place
of performance governs issues relating to performance (such as
manner of performance, excuse for nonperformance, and sufficiency of performance). 4 Multilateralism was the dominant
choice-of-law approach in the United States during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century,3 5
and many of the jurisdiction-selecting rules developed under
that approach continue to influence U.S. choice of law.36
Multilateralism also has been the dominant type of choice-oflaw methodology in Europe until recently. In the area of
contracts, however, that approach has given way to a center of
gravity approach in the European Union under the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations."
A primary group of interests served by multilateralism are
the interests of the system as a whole. The goal of this approach is to have a conflicts law that is uniformly defined and
administered throughout a community of jurisdictions. 9 To
that end, the multilateral approach divvies up the competence
to decide specific issues among the jurisdictions, and directs

32. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
33. Id. § 332.
34. Id. § 358.
35. See Shreve, supra note 3, at 283.
36. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.5, at 15.
37. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
38. Rome Convention, supra note 27.
39. See Shreve, supra note 3, at 282-23:
Multilateralism strives for uniform results in choice of law. To the
multilateralist judge, the possible sources of chosen law are sovereigns, or
jurisdictions, that make up a kind of legal community ....
Ideally, each
member of this community of jurisdictions would use the common conflicts rule, and uniform choice-of-law results would exist in fact.
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each jurisdiction to apply the law of the jurisdiction that has
been chosen as the one with competence over that issue. It
provides clear rules to be applied in a neutral fashion, which
accords foreign law the same importance as the forum's law,
thereby furthering the interests of certainty and predictability,
mutual respect, and cooperation.
Among the interests of the parties to the transaction,
multilateralism favors the interests in certainty and predictability and in uniform application. Because it provides clear
rules as to the law that will apply, the parties can plan their
transactions with a fairly high degree of certainty as to governing law. The clarity of the rules also reduces the parties'
costs in determining applicable law. Further, clear rules make
it more likely that a court will apply the rules consistently to
reach the same result across a number of cases, and, to the
extent multilateralism's emphasis on systemic interests has
lead to uniform acceptance of choice-of-law rules among jurisdictions, they also make uniform application among potential
fora more likely.
On the other hand, the emphasis on certainty and predictability means that the parties' expectations and fairness concerns are given less weight. The rigid application of clear rules
needed to obtain certainty and predictability and uniform application means that fairness and party expectations cannot be
evaluated in individual cases. Instead, these interests are
taken into account up-front when the choice-of-law rules are
established through the connecting factors that dictate application of a particular law.40 Because party expectations generally coincide with territorial or domiciliary allocations, it is assumed that the law dictated by the choice-of-law rules normally will coincide with the expectations of the parties.4 Similarly, application of that law normally will satisfy fairness
concerns because the parties have engaged in activity that is
deemed the type of contact with a jurisdiction that makes it

40. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that the European preference for
black letter rules is based on the underlying assumption "that if a rule incorporates the appropriate policies and interests and is well-drafted, its blackletter
character will not lead to unjust results, except in extreme, and thus rare, cases").
41. See id. at 20-24 (noting that territorial criteria serve a notice function in
the international context because people normally understand that crossing a national border "entails a change not only of language and currency but also of
law").
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fair for the jurisdiction's law to apply.4 2 The parties' interest
in choosing a substantively favorable law is furthered by a
multilateral rule only to the extent that the clarity of that rule
gives the parties the ability to structure their transaction so
that the relevant connecting factor occurs in the jurisdiction
whose law they prefer.
The concerns of interested jurisdictions are compromised
in the multilateral approach to the extent that jurisdictions
must give up the ability to apply their own law to some situations that implicate their policy choices and that affect their
nationals in the interest of the system as a whole. In return,
however, the rules allocate to each jurisdiction exclusive competence over certain events occurring within their jurisdiction
or affecting their domiciliaries .by making these types of contacts the basis for the choice-of-law rules.
B.

Center of Gravity Approach

Instead of establishing clear choice-of-law rules that dictate a priori the law that will apply to a particular category of
transactions based on the occurrence of a particular event or
the location of one of the parties within the chosen jurisdiction,
the center of gravity approach directs the forum to apply the
law of the jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the
particular transaction or, in some cases, the particular issue
before it. This is the approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws, which states that the applicable law is that of the state with "the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties,"43 as well as by
the Rome Convention, which states that "the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected."4 Guidance in determining which jurisdiction
has the closest connection is provided through a list of contacts
to be taken into account in making the determination and/or a

42. Dissatisfaction with this type of rough justice was one of the motivations
for the abandonment of multilateral rules in the United States in favor of other
more ad hoe approaches. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.6, at 15 ("Dissatisfaction with the fixed and thus mechanical-but also predictable-rules of the
First Restatement resulted in a number of new suggestions and counter-suggests,
a 'revolution' in American conflicts law.).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 188(1).
44. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(1).
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series of presumptions as to applicable law based on a specific

contact with a jurisdiction.45
The balance of interests under this type of choice-of-law
rule is to a large extent the mirror-image of the balance of
those interests under a multilateral approach. The interests of
the system in certainty and predictability, uniform application,
and mutual respect and cooperation are downplayed to some
extent in favor of the interests of individual jurisdictions in
applying their law when their policies are implicated and when
their nationals are involved. The flexible rules of this approach
allow the forum on an ad hoc basis to fine-tune the relationship between the interested jurisdictions and the particular
45. Section 6 of the Second Restatement sets out a list of general principles
to guide the forum's determination, while section 188 lists contacts to be taken
into account in applying those principles to contracts. The Restatement also indicates the jurisdiction whose law usually will be applied based on that jurisdiction's
connections. For instance, section 188(3) provides that when' the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the law of
that state usually will apply. Statements as to the jurisdiction whose law usually
will apply with regard to certain types of contracts are given in the sections following section 188, but subject to a finding that under the section 6 principles another state has a more significant relationship.
The Rome Convention is "more 'state selective' and less 'approach'-oriented,
than the Restatement." SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.18, at 47. It sets out
rebuttable presumptions as to the country that has the closest connection. For
example, Article 4(2) of the Rome Convention provides that:
[Ilt shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with
the country where the party who is to effect the performance which is
characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or in the case of a body corporate or
unincorporate, its central administration.
Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(2).
The "characteristic performance" is
[The performance for which the payment [of money under the contract]
is due, i.e. depending on the type of contract, the delivery of goods, the
granting of the right to make use of an item of property, the provision of
a service, transport, insurance, banking operations, security, etc., which
usually constitutes the centre of gravity and the socio-economic function
of the contractual transaction.
Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by
Mario Giuliano, Professor, University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1, 20 [hereinafter Report on the Convention].
The Rome Convention also applies a bright line rule with regard to certain consumer contracts, providing that those contracts are governed by "the law of the
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence," Rome Convention,
supra note 27, art. 5(3), and a presumption in favor of the law of the jurisdiction
in which an employee works to govern individual employment contracts, id. art.
6(2). The Rome Convention thus limits the discretion of the forum in choosing the
applicable law to a significantly greater extent than does the Second Restatement.
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transaction in determining the applicable law. Under this
approach, systemic concerns are taken into account as factors
in the forum's determination of the closest connection,46 and
through presumptions as to the applicable law. Similarly, the
parties' interests in certainty and predictability, the ability to
structure their transaction in light of substantively favorable
law, and in uniformity of result are downplayed to give the
forum the flexibility to focus on party expectations and fairness
in individual cases.4"
C. ContractualChoice of Law
Another approach to choice of law is to allow the parties to
select the law that will govern their relationship as a term of

46. The Second Restatement, for example, lists among the factors relevant to
the choice-of-law decision "the needs of the interstate and international systems"
and "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAW, supra note 2, § 6(2)(a)(f). In addition, the specific connecting
factors draw on the former rules of the First Restatement multilateralist approach,
transforming those rules into part of an approach "by making a single traditional
connecting factor of the prior system ...
one among several to be considered and
by providing the concept of the 'most significant relationship' as a guiding principle." SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.14, at 36.
47. Early U.S. cases rejecting the multilateralist approach of the First Restatement in favor of a center of gravity approach expressly recognized this balancing of interests. See, e.g., Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) ('The law of the jurisdiction having the closest relation to the
contract is selected because, it is felt, the parties contracted probably with that
law (if any law) in mind, and that jurisdiction would probably have the greatest
interest in defining the rights of the contracting parties."); Boston Law Book Co. v.
Hathorn, 119 Vt. 416, 423 (1956) (when the court has identified the center of
gravity of the contract, or of the aspect of the contract before the court, the court
has "identified the jurisdiction with which the matter at hand is predominantly or
most intimately concerned, [and] they conclude that this is the proper law of the
contract which the parties presumably had in view at the time of contracting");
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155 (1954).
Although this 'grouping of contacts" theory may, perhaps, afford less certainty and predictability than the rigid general rules . . . the merit of its
approach is that it gives to the place 'having the most interest in the
problem" paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the forum to apply the policy of the
jurisdiction "most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular
litigation . . . ." Moreover, by stressing the significant contacts, it enables
the court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdictions involved . . . but also to give effect to the probable intention of the
parties and consideration to "whether one rule or the other produces the
best practical result."
Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
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their contract. Choice-of-law rules that recognize the ability of
the parties to choose for themselves the law that will apply to
their transaction value most highly the parties' planning-related interests, and, in particular, their interest in certainty and
predictability." Contractual choice of law also values the
parties' concern that they be able to pick a substantively favorable law to govern their transaction.4 9 Finally, contractual
choice-of-law limits, although it does not remove, the parties'
concern about uniformity of application. Because the choice-oflaw decision is made by the parties themselves rather than by
the forum, the only uniformity concern the parties will have is
the extent to which the contractual choice will be recognized
within a given forum, and uniformly by all potential fora.
The extent to which the parties' expectation and fairness
interests are valued depends upon the nature of the parties or
the transaction. If the parties are repeat players or the transaction is sufficiently large to make it cost effective to take
applicable law into consideration, then party expectations and
fairness concerns are likely to be satisfied by allowing the
parties to choose the applicable law. To the extent that it is not
efficient for one of the parties to take choice of law into consideration in contracting, then contractual choice-of-law provisions can devalue these interests.
Contractual choice of law downplays the concerns of interested jurisdictions as well as systemic concerns. Because the
choice-of-law decision is removed from the forum and placed in
the hands of the contracting parties, the choice may be made
without any consideration of the interests of a jurisdiction in
controlling activities within its borders, enforcing its policy
determinations, or protecting its citizens. Similarly, because
the forum does not select the jurisdiction whose substantive
law will be applied, systemic concerns related to the application of choice-of-law rules within a choice-of-law system are not
addressed.
As with any decision concerning the applicable substantive
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 187

cmt. e (stating that certainty and predictability are most likely to be secured by
letting the parties choose the law to govern their contract).
49. The extent to which this concern is valued by a particular contractual
choice-of-law provision is reflected in whether the parties' choices are limited to a

choice among interested jurisdictions, or the parties also are allowed to choose the
law of an unrelated jurisdiction.
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law, however, the decision as to whether the substantive law
chosen by the parties will be applied ultimately rests with the
forum. A primary rationale for downplaying the concerns of
interested jurisdictions and the choice-of-law system by enforcing the parties' contractual choice is that contract law traditionally has been recognized as a system of private ordering
that normally has an impact only on the parties to the con0 Therefore, the sovereign's interests normally are not
tract."
significantly impacted by the private contractual arrangements
of individuals. As long as the sovereign is satisfied that the
interests of the public in general are not significantly implicated, and that the parties to the contract do not need protection,
the principal of party autonomy prevails. The extent to which
this rationale holds true, however, obviously depends upon the
nature of the particular contract and the parties to it. Although the average contract to sell widgets may have little
impact on the public interests that are the concern of sovereigns, the sovereign may view the proverbial contract to sell
babies much differently.
The general principle that parties should be able to choose
the law applicable to their contract in certain circumstances is
well-accepted. 5' The issue that causes controversy is the extent to which that choice should be limited in order to give
weight to other interests, particularly those of interested jurisdictions, and the expectation and fairness interests of the parties. In general, existing contractual choice-of-law provisions do
give weight to these interests through restrictions, although
the nature of the restrictions varies. For example, U.C.C. section 1-105 limits the parties' ability to choose the applicable
law to situations in which the transaction bears a reasonable
relation to more than one state, and to a choice among the

50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 187
cmt. e ("Giving parties this power of choice is . . . consistent with the fact that, in
contrast to other areas of the law, persons are free within broad limits to determine the nature of their contractual obligations.").
51. See, e.g., id. § 187 (allowing the parties to choose the law that will govern
their contractual rights and duties, subject to certain restrictions); Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 3 (same); U.C.C. § 1-105 (same); Report on the Convention, supra note 45, at 15 ("The rule stated in Article 3(1) under which the contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties simply reaffirms a rule currently embodied in private international law of all the Member States of the Community and of most other countries.").

140

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXV:I

substantive laws of jurisdictions with a reasonable relationship
to the transaction.52 This type of restriction gives greater
weight to the interests of interested jurisdictions, and, to the
extent that relationship to a jurisdiction also coincides with the
expectations of the parties and with fairness considerations,
gives greater effect to those interests as well.5" On the other
hand, the Rome Convention does not require that the law chosen by the parties be related to their transaction, but does
make the parties' contractual choice subject to certain mandatory rules, including those of a country that is the sole country
with a connection to transaction,' those of a consumer's residence in certain consumer transactions,55 those of the country
in which an employee habitually carries out his work, 5 and
those of the forum. Although different in nature from the
limits on contractual choice in U.C.C. section 1-105, the Rome
Convention limits also are attempts to take into account the
concerns of interested jurisdictions and the expectation and
fairness interests of the parties.
D. Public Policy and MandatoryRules
Choice-of-law provisions providing the forum with a rationale for applying a law other than that to which other choiceof-law rules would lead it also are a common feature of choiceof-law systems. A public policy exception allows the forum to
refuse to apply the law chosen because that law is substan-

52. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995).
53. Compare Second Restatement section 187, which allows the parties to
choose the law of any jurisdiction to govern their contract with regard to matters
that could have been resolved by a contractual provision, but requires that the law
chosen have a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or that
there be some other reasonable basis for the parties' choice with regard to issues
the parties could not have resolved by contract.
54. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(3).
55. Id. art. 5(2).
56. Id. art. 6(1).
57. Id. art. 7(2). Article 7 also authorizes the judge to apply the mandatory
rules of another country with which the situation has a close connection. Id. art
7(1). See also U.C.C. § 1-301(a)(b)(c) (ALI Council Draft, Nov. 22, 1999) (parties
may pick the applicable law "whether or not the transaction bears a relation to
the State or country designated," but choice is significantly limited when one of
the parties is a consumer, and is unenforceable when the law designated "is contrary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would otherwise
govern").
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tively unacceptable.5 8 Mandatory rules are the mirror-image
of the public policy exception-they are substantive rules that
are considered so imperative that they will be applied regardless of whether they are chosen by the general conflicts rule.59
The public policy exception can be applied only to serve
the interests of the forum, or it can be applied to serve the
interests of other jurisdictions, as well as the systemic values
of mutual respect and cooperation. When the relevant public
policy is only that of the forum, 0 then the only sovereign interest clearly served is the interest of the forum in controlling
the use of its courts for the adjudication of foreign law.6 ' By
refusing to apply the foreign law chosen when that law is substantively offensive, the forum is placing a limit on the extent
to which comity requires that it expend its resources to enforce
the law of another jurisdiction. To the extent the public policy
exception is applied in this fashion, it devalues the systemic
interests in certainty and predictability, and mutual respect
and cooperation. Depending on the circumstances in which it is
applied, it may also devalue the interests of other jurisdictions
in controlling actions within their borders, enforcing their
policy determinations, and protecting their nationals. If, on the
other hand, the forum also refuses to apply a law contrary to
the public policy of another interested jurisdiction, 2 systemic
58. See REIMANN, supra note 1, at 28.
59. See id. Cf Johan A. Erauw, InternationalAduancement of Consumer Interests Through Conflicts Rules, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF
LAWS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 70, 75-76 (Peter gar~eviM ed. 1990) (the public
policy exception denies application of chosen law based on "notions of minimum
decency or protection not acknowledged by the particular foreign law," while mandatory rules, instead of being a negative or restrictive control, directly impose
themselves by defining their territorial sphere of application as including
transnational cases).
60. It is generally recognized that a forum may always refuse to enforce a
foreign law that is contrary to its own public policy. See e.g., Rome Convention,
supra note 27, art. 16 ("The application of a rule of the law of any country specified by this Convention may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy ... of the forum."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 90 ("No action will be entertained on a foreign
cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of
the forum."); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 3.15, at 72 ("Under the traditional
approach to choice of law, the forum's territorially-oriented rule might refer to a
law, the enforcement of which would be offensive to the public policy of the forum.").
61. Of course, if the forum then proceeds by applying its own law, other of its
interests ultimately may be served.
62. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, §
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concerns of mutual respect and cooperation, as well as sovereign concerns, are furthered. The public policy exception thus
can be used either as a tool of conflict or a means of encouraging reciprocity.
Similarly, a forum can apply only its own mandatory rules
or can also apply the mandatory rules of another interested
jurisdiction. For example, while the Rome Convention provides
for application of the forum's mandatory rules, it also authorizes the forum to give effect "to the mandatory rules of the law
of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country,
those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the
contract."6 3 When the mandatory rules doctrine is limited to
rules of the forum, then the forum's sovereign interest in furthering its own policies is highly valued to the detriment of the
interests of other sovereigns and systemic concerns of mutual
respect and cooperation. If the forum also takes into account
the mandatory rules of another interested jurisdiction, then
these interests are given more weight.
Because the public policy exception and the application of
mandatory rules result in the application of law other than
that selected by the normal choice-of-law rules, including the
law chosen by the parties in their contract,' these principles

187(2)(b) (forum will not apply the law chosen by the parties if application of that
law "would be contrary to a fundamental policy of state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue"
and would be the state whose law would apply in the absence of the parties'
choice of the governing law); U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (ALI Council Draft, Nov. 22, 1999)
(parties' choice of governing law is unenforceable when the law designated "is
contrary to a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would otherwise govern").
63. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art 7. Article 7 can lead to consideration
of the mandatory rules of three jurisdictions: (1) the forum; (2) the jurisdiction
chosen by the parties; and, (3) the law of a third State closely connected with the
contract. See Erik Jayme, The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980), in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF LAWS,
supra note 59, at 36, 47. The Rome Convention also requires application of the
protective mandatory rules of the country of a consumer's residence in certain
consumer contracts, Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 5(2), and of the country
in which an employee habitually carries out his work, id. art 6(1), even though
the parties have chosen the law of another country in their contract.
64. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1199, 1209-10.
The possibilities for private legal ordering are not limitless. Every nation
has mandatory laws that govern particular transactions or relationships
regardless of the wishes of the parties. The primary justifications for
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diminish the parties' planning-related interests in certainty
and predictability and the ability to chose favorable law. Depending on the way in which these rules are used, they also
can devalue the parties' expectation and fairness interests, and
their interest in uniform application.
This section has attempted to analyze the different choiceof-law rules in isolation from each other, in order to highlight
the interests that each primarily serves and devalues. As a
practical matter, however, most modern choice-of-law regimes
are likely to contain features of each of these rules in order to
effectuate a particular balancing of the relevant interests discussed in Part II. Thus, for instance, although center of gravity
approaches abandon the use of bright line rules as a way of
selecting a priori the law that will apply, those approaches
may be combined with some multilateral rules.65 Similarly,
center of gravity approaches often are combined with provisions authorizing contractual choice-of-law in order to compensate for the lack of emphasis on certainty and predictability
concerns in the center of gravity approach itself.66 Further, as
discussed above, contractual choice-of-law provisions usually
are coupled with limitations, such as those based on public
policy and mandatory rules, in order to give more weight to the
interests of interested jurisdictions and to party expectation
and fairness concerns.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOFTWARE LICENSING THAT MIGHT
AFFECT CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
This section considers whether there are characteristics of
software licensing that should be considered in coming up with
the appropriate balance of interests in this area. The section

such laws are paternalism and protection of third parties .... Unlike

conflicts of default laws, conflicts of mandatory laws cannot be resolved
easily by private contract.
Id.
65. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 5(3) (providing that the
law of the consumer's residence, rather than the law selected through application
of the "most closely connected" test, applies with regard to certain consumer transactions).
66. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 2.14, at 36 (noting that "[a] corollary
of the 'most significant relationship' test is that the parties, by their own choice,
should be able to give their relationship a center . . . [by] stipulat[ing the applicable law").
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discusses two characteristics of these transactions that might
influence choice-of-law rules: (1) the method of contracting,
and, (2) the nature of the subject matter of the contract.
A.

The Method of Contracting

Internet activity has become the focus of many recent
discussions about the appropriate rules to apply in multi-jurisdictional transactions, including the appropriate choice-of-law
rules.6 7 The Internet "allows remote parties to enter and perform contracts spanning multiple jurisdictions and operating in
circumstances that do not depend on physical location of either
party or the information.""5 The relatively low cost of widespread dissemination of information over the Internet also
enables small entities to engage in international business
transactions to an extent that would not be possible through
other forms of distribution.69
The exponential increase in commerce flowing across borders made possible by the Internet clearly is a phenomenon
that any system of choice-of-law rules in the area of contracts
must consider. This phenomenon, for instance, suggests the
increasing importance of systemic concerns in fashioning and
applying choice-of-law rules, as increasingly the transactions
those rules must address will cross national borders. Indeed,
the systemic problems created by the number of jurisdictions
that may claim an interest in regulating these transactions
may be the primary concern that must be taken into account in
fashioning choice-of-law rules to deal with the Internet.
The use of Internet contracting, however, is not a factor

67. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1199; Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territorialityand Authors' Rights in a Networked
World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (1999); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law for
Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (1997);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). As discussed in Part V infra, the primary justifications given by the drafters of UCITA for its choice-of-law rules relate
to the characteristics and needs of Internet contracting.
68. UCITA § 109 cmt. 2 (2000).
69. See Raymond T. Nimmer, UCITA: Modern Contract Law for a Modern
Information Economy, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 230 (1999) ("The ability of small entities to engage in significant information commerce has geometrically expanded with the
advent of the InternetV).
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that distinguishes software from other commodities, and thus
is not a factor that necessarily would cause the choice-of-law
rules for software licenses to be different from the rules for
other contracts. Internet marketing is a phenomenon that
affects contracting with regard to all commodities, not just
software. Contracts for goods and services as well as contracts
for software are concluded on the Internet.7 ° On the other
hand, software, as well as goods and services, is also sold at
physical locations and over the telephone. Thus, while the new
contracting mode made available by the Internet certainly will
need to be considered in developing and applying choice-of-law
rules,7 ' it does not provide a significant basis for distinguishing between the choice-of-law rules for software and those that
apply to contracts for other types of commodities.
There is, however, a distributional difference between
licensing software over the Internet and the sale of goods and
services there. Unlike tangible goods and services, which must
be delivered to the buyer after the contract is entered, software, as an intangible, can be delivered online.72 The fact that
intellectual property is an intangible means that certain connecting factors, such as location of the subject matter of the
contract, or place of performance of the contract, will not be
particularly meaningful in choosing the jurisdiction whose law
should apply to intellectual property contracts. 73 The intangible nature of the subject matter of a contract, however, has

70. During the 1999 Christmas season, Internet shopping increased by 300%
over the previous year, to an estimated 12 billion dollars. The top seller was
books-clearly information, but not software-Lthe books were not downloaded on
disk, but shipped UPS. Another top seller was garden tools. NBC Nightly News,
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 9, 2000).
71. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that certain characteristics of
the Internet should cause sovereigns to refrain from regulation of Internet transactions in favor of self-regulation by Internet users and providers. See, e.g., Johnson
& Post, supra note 67, at 1367. Others argue that Internet transactions "are not
significantly less resistant to the tools of conflict of laws, than other transnational
transactions." Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1199, 1201. For further discussion of
this issue, see infra Part V.
72. This "delivery" can take the form of actual downloading of a copy of the
software product, or merely the provision of access to the software for its use

online.
73. See EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS 7 (1976) (Intellectual property is "by its nature as an intangible object, not
spatially confined;" therefore, "in contrast to rights to corporeal property, it is
impossible to use the criterion of situation in a given place").
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never prevented a choice-of-law regime from developing appropriate factors to connect that intangible to a particular jurisdiction. 4 Thus, the intangible nature of intellectual property
does not distinguish it from other types of intangible property
for which choice-of-law rules have been developed. Therefore,
the method of delivery of software also does not seem a particularly significant factor in differentiating the choice-of-law
rules that would apply to software.
B.

The Subject Matter of the Contract

Although the method of contracting does not provide a
relevant basis for distinguishing software licenses from other
contracts for choice-of-law purposes, the nature of the "product"
involved in licensing does. Intellectual property rights are
purely the creatures of the law, whose nature and extent are
determined by a jurisdiction's balance between "protecting
property interests in information to encourage its creation and
the importance of a rich public domain upon which most innovation ultimately depends."75 The balance struck between
these competing interests is a matter of fundamental public
concern, and different jurisdictions strike the balance differently, so that the nature and extent of intellectual property rights
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The importance of intellectual property to each sovereign
is reflected in the territorial nature of the choice-of-law rules
that have developed with regard to enforcement actions for
copyright infringement. For example, the Berne Convention,
the primary multilateral convention protecting copyright, provides that, except for the minimum standards established by
the Berne Convention itself, its signatories have no obligation
to enforce any copyright law other than their own. Instead,
their obligation is simply to grant to authors from other countries the same copyright protection that they give to their own
nationals.7 6 The Berne Convention thus establishes a choice-

74. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1995) (law of jurisdiction in which debtor is
located governs perfection and effect of perfection or nonperfection of security interest in accounts and general intangibles); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 9, § 19.27,
at 787-88 (discussing transfer of intangible claims).
75. UCITA § 105 cmt. 3 (2000).
76. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of
Sept. 9, 1886, done May 4, 1886 (Paris), revised Nov. 13, 1967 (Berlin), done Mar.
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of-law rule for copyright infringement actions that the applicable copyright law is the law of the nation in which the infringement occurs, not the law of the state of which the author is a
national, or in which the work was first published." The ter-

29, 1914 (Berne), revised June 2, 1948 (Brussels), July 14, 1967 (Stockholm), last
revised at the Paris Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971 (Paris), 25
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Article II of the Convention reads as follows:
1.
Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works
first published in that State shall enjoy in each other Contracting
State the same protection as that other State accords to works of
its nationals first published in its own territory, as well as the
protection specially granted by this Convention.
2.
Unpublished works of nationals of each Contracting State shall
enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as that
other State accords to unpublished works of its own nationals, as
well as the protection specially granted by this Convention
Id. art. 2(1)(2). See also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 17.05 (1972 & Supp. 1999) (discussing the principle of national treatment) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
77. See NIMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 17.05; accord, S.M. STEWART,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS § 3.17 (2d ed. 1989) ("The
principle of national treatment also means that both the question of whether the
right exists and the question of the scope of the right are to be answered in accordance with the law of the country where the protection is claimed.").
Although U.S. courts often have applied the national treatment principle to
all issues in a copyright infringement action, e.g., Dae Han Video Productions, Inc.
v. Kuk Dong Oriental Food, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1294, 1298 (D. Md. 1990) (rejecting argument that Korean copyright law was relevant to determination of whether
foreign works were works for hire in U.S. infringement action), the Second Circuit
has held that the law of the nation in which the infringement occurs only applies
to issues regarding the scope of substantive copyright protection, while the law of
the nation with the most significant relationship to the work governs issues related to ownership of the copyrighted work. ITAR-TASS Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1998). Similarly, Professor Jane
C. Ginsburg has argued for a choice-of-law rule that would apply the law of the
country of origin, rather than the law of the protecting country, to issues relating
to copyright ownership. Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the
Private International Law of Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 166-67
(1998). Professor Ginsburg asserts that applying the law of the country of origin
would further the Berne Convention goal of promoting international dissemination
of works of authorship by removing the disruption to international commerce that
application of multiple laws to copyright ownership could cause, would ensure
"that the work will not change owners by operation of law each time the work
crosses an international boundary," and would allow "licensees in all countries [to]
know that they have acquired rights from their owner," thus reinforcing "the security of international contracts." Id. at 169-70. Professor Ginsburg, however, believes
that the initial choice of law of the country of origin should not be absolute. The
law of the country of origin will not apply when under the law of the protecting
country "the result of applying the foreign law would conflict with strongly held
local public policy" reflected in the protecting country's copyright laws. Id. at 17374. Thus, "while the law of the source country governs what the author may
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ritorial-and territorially limited-nature of intellectual property rights reflected in the Berne Convention principle of national treatment also is reflected in U.S. court decisions holding that the U.S. Copyright Act has no extraterritorial application,"8 and in the general refusal by U.S. courts to entertain
suits for copyright infringement based on the copyright laws of
other countries.79
The choice-of-law rules established by the Berne Convention with regard to copyright protection suggest two important
features about intellectual property that are likely to affect the
choice-of-law rules applied to govern intellectual property contracts. First, the principle of national treatment underlines the
fact that, as a practical matter, there is no unitary concept of
"intellectual property rights"-except to the extent the Berne
Convention or other international agreements establish uniform minimum standards on their signatories, intellectual
property is a bundle of legal rights, the nature and extent of
which changes as one moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Thus, the "commodity" involved in intellectual property licensing is not only an intangible, but an intangible that has no
fixed content on an international scale.
Second, the strictly territorial nature of the choice-of-law
rule embedded in the national treatment principle underlines
the importance to each jurisdiction of the public policy embodied in that jurisdiction's particular balancing of the interests in
innovation and free access to define the content of intellectual
property rights within its borders. The national treatment
principle seems to reflect a policy that the interest of various
jurisdictions in copyright is so important that no jurisdiction

grant, the law of the host country may also determine what the grantee may
receive in that jurisdiction." Id. at 173.
78. See, e.g., Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69
F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995) ("federal copyright law does not apply to extraterritorial acts of infringement"); accord, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, §
17.02.
79. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 76, § 17.03. The specific rationale
for the refusal to entertain an action under foreign copyright laws has varied, but
often is based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See id. Some commentators have suggested that copyright infringement actions should not be viewed as
transitory causes of action. See id. But see Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 67, at
153 (arguing that copyright infringement is a transitory cause of action, and thus

that a U.S. court should entertain an action for foreign infringements when U.S.
infringements also have occurred in the interest of efficiency).
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should be able to impose the particular balance reflected in its
copyright laws on another jurisdiction. Under the principle of
national treatment, no jurisdiction is obligated to enforce the
policy of another; and, concomitantly, no jurisdiction is placed
in the position of having the content of its policy subjected to
the interpretation of another jurisdiction's courts.
These two characteristics of the "product" involved in intellectual property contracts-the territorially-based definition of
its content, and the strong public policy reflected in that definition-inevitably will affect the types of issues that choice-oflaw rules designed to deal with the contractual aspects of intellectual property must address. In particular, they suggest that
contract choice-of-law rules in this area will have to deal on a
regular basis with two issues that arise relatively rarely in
most commercial contracts-issues of characterization and
issues of strong public policy.
1. Characterization Issues
The territorial treatment of copyright for purposes of protection and enforcement points to the inevitability as well as
the significance of characterization of issues in determining the
applicable choice-of-law rules in this area. Obviously, when an
issue before the court is characterized as one dealing with
enforcement of copyright protections, rather than a question of
interpretation of contract rights, the principle of national treatment applies, not the contractual choice-of-law rules, whatever
they may be.8" Even when contract interpretation clearly is
involved, however, the purely legal and territorial nature of
intellectual property rights suggests that if the interpretive
issue relates to the nature and scope of the intellectual property rights of the licensor, then the law of the jurisdiction creating the rights, rather than the law selected by the contract
choice-of-law rules, should apply. As Professor Eugen Ulmer
has stated:
The principle of territoriality which prevails in copyright does

80. Cf. Shepard's McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Legalsoft Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1161,
1164, 1166 (D. Colo. 1991) (characterizing a claim as one primarily for copyright
infringement rather than contract interpretation for purposes of determining effect
of contractual choice-of-law provision on personal jurisdiction and of determining
federal subject matter jurisdiction).
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not mean that copyright agreements as a whole are to be
judged according to the law of the protecting country. Instead, ... it is to be applied to given aspects of the agreements. The questions involved are those which-like the
question of assignability-concern the legal nature of the
right as imprinted by the law of the protecting country, as
well as questions which-like that of the effect as against
third persons-are of importance for legal transactions in the
protecting country. The application of the law of the protecting country to these questions is compulsory, whereas the law
of the contract may be determined by the parties' choice of
8
law. 1

Thus, to give a very obvious example, if a license grants
licensor's "U.S. rights," the purely legal and territorial nature
of those rights dictate that U.S. copyright law be applied to
determine what rights were granted, rather than the law that
choice-of-law rules would select to govern the contract. Indeed,
the very description of the rights in the license in this example
acknowledges that this is the case.82
The distinction between issues relating to the definition of
the underlying property rights and those that are contractual
is likely, however, to generate much subtler characterization
problems. For example, assume that the law of the jurisdiction
creating the rights involved provides in its statute extending

81. ULMER, supra note 73, at 46 (1978). The intellectual property choice-of-law
rules proposed by Professor Eugen Ulmer under the auspices of the Max Planck
Institute for possible inclusion in the Rome Convention adopt this distinction. The
law of the protecting country (the country for whose territory protection is
claimed) governs issues concerning the "creation, scope and termination of a copyright," including interests in the copyright, what may be assigned and the effect of
assignment on third parties. Other issues were to be determined in accordance
with the Rome Convention. Id. at 99-100.
Professor Ulmer adopts the law of the protecting country as the applicable
law for issues relating to the nature and scope of the licensor's intellectual property rights because of the territorial principles embodied in the Berne Convention
and other copyright treaties. See id. at 9-11. As discussed, see supra note 77,
there is some authority for applying instead the law of the country with the most
significant relationship or the law of the country of origin to at least certain ownership issues.
82. Cf ITAR-TASS Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82,
90-91 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying law of Russia, the country of origin, as the country
with the most significant relationship to determine issues relating to ownership of
the copyright, including the nature of that ownership, and law of the United
States as the jurisdiction in which the alleged infringement occurred to the infringement issues).
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copyright protection to software that a licensee does not need
the rightholder's permission to reproduce the software's object
code and translate its form when the decompilation is necessary to achieve interoperability,"3 and that this right to
decompile cannot be excluded by contract.' Is the issue of
whether a contract provision prohibiting reverse engineering
should be enforced a question to be determined by the law
selected by applicable contract choice-of-law rules, or is it an
issue relating to the nature and extent of the property rights
held by the licensor governed by the law of the jurisdiction creating those rights? One certainly can argue that the
nonwaivable right to reverse engineer provided in the copyright statute is part of the "legal nature of the [intellectual
property] right as imprinted by the protecting jurisdiction."
Further, the nature of intellectual property contracts suggests that these types of characterization issues are likely to be
endemic. Most intellectual property contracts serve dual functions: they both delineate the parties' obligations in connection
with the transaction, and serve as the instrument conveying85
the interest or right of use in the intellectual property.
Thus, issues governed by the law of the jurisdiction creating
the rights-those regarding the scope, creation, and termination of copyright-are latent in every contract interpretation
with regard to an intellectual property license. To complicate
matters further, the rights given to the licensee are determined not only by the nature of the licensor's rights, but also
by specific contract provisions delineating the licensee's right
of use. This means that the ultimate definition of the "product"
that is the subject of a software license is a combination of the
rights the licensor had to grant (as defined by the law of the
relevant copyright jurisdiction) and the parameters of permis83. See Council Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs, art. 6(1), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 1 [hereinafter EC Software Directive]. This
Directive has been implemented into national law in all Member States. See GUY
TRiTrON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 224-33 (1996).
84. See EC Software Directive, supra note 83, art 9(1). This Directive thus
moves beyond making reverse engineering a defense in an infringement action,
making it in essence a nonwaivable right of the licensee.
85. See ULMER, supra note 73, at 44 ("as a rule, in legal practice the assignment or grant of rights is embodied in the contracts in which the obligations of
the parties are laid down; in a publishing contract not only are the obligations of
the author and the publisher laid down, but also the assignment or grant of the
right of reproduction and distribution of the work").
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sible use defined by the contract terms (and, thus, by the law
chosen by the applicable contract choice-of-law rules).
2. Public Policy Concerns
The important public policy aspects of intellectual property
suggest that the concerns of interested jurisdictions are implicated by intellectual property contracts in a way that they are
not implicated by most commercial contracts-" [a]lthough
computer information is a central feature of commerce in this
economy, it is still information and calls into play the panoply
of important social issues associated with information and its
dissemination in our society." 6 Because the rights to use software conveyed by a license depend not only on the terms of the
license, but also on the intellectual property rights that have
been granted to the licensor, these issues of public policy also
are endemic to intellectual property contacts.87 When the
terms of the contract conflict with the intellectual property
rights granted, and the important public policies embodied in
the balance of incentives and opportunities those rights repre86. Nimmer, supra note 69, at 230 (discussing First Amendment implications
of restrictions on software).
87. Cf. id. at 227 ("Because the transactions focus on computer information,
important transactional issues commonly exist in reference to what rights to use
are to be conveyed. These issues are not present when goods are sold. In a sale of
goods, the buyer owns the subject matter (e.g., the toaster); ownership creates
exclusive rights in the item purchased. In contrast, when the subject matter is
computer information, a person who acquires a copy may own the diskette, but
does not own the information or rights associated with it. Instead, the person's
rights to use the information depend on contract terms and intellectual property
rights. Terms of the agreement determine what the purchaser obtains beyond the
diskette.") Professor Nimmer points out in his Article in this Symposium that
other principles in addition to intellectual property law, such as the terms of the
license, govern the right to control access to and use of information by the licensee. Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions:An Essay on Law
in an Information Society, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 5 (2000). The fact that the ultimate "product" received by the licensee is defined by other principles in addition
to intellectual property law, however, does not detract from the fundamental importance of intellectual property law to that definition. The monopoly to control
use granted the licensor by intellectual property law is the fundamental protection
that allows the licensor to obtain value from intellectual property through its dissemination, subject to the licensor's controls on use. Contract terms only bind the
parties to the contract. Intellectual property law gives good protection against
third parties as well. Thus, the intellectual property rights granted the licensor
clearly are what gives the "product" its initial baseline value to both the licensor
and the licensee, although its ultimate value to the licensee may be further defined by contractual restrictions.
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sent, then what appear to be issues of private contracting can
take on a significant public policy aspect.
The strength of the public policy issues that can be implicated in the software licensing area by what at first blush
seem to be purely contract questions is illustrated by the heated debate during the drafting of UCITA over the relationship
between contract and intellectual property law. The crux of
this debate, which was conducted not only in the drafting committee and the sponsoring organizations of the project,88 but
also in the academic community, is the extent to which the
parties may by contract agree to restrictions that conflict with
public policies of the U.S. Constitution, federal copyright and
competition laws, and, to some extent, state laws, such as
trade secret laws and laws regulating non-competition agreements. 9
The UCITA drafters argued that UCITA is neutral on
these issues-UCITA is a commercial statute providing rules
for contracting in furtherance of the contract law values of
freedom of contract and facilitation of commercial practice;"
the debate over "how and where information is made available
and what rights or protections are appropriate for the new
methods of distribution" are the subject of "a wide-ranging
property law debate that ultimately goes to very fundamental
social policy issues about the use and distribution of informa-

88. UCITA began life as a proposed addition to the Uniform Commercial Code
to be known as Article 2B. It thus originally was a joint project between the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute, the cosponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code. In April, 1999, however, NCCUSL and the ALI agreed to terminate the Article 2B project, and
NCCUSL continued the project as a uniform state law, rather than as an addition
to the U.C.C. UCITA was adopted by NCCUSL in July, 1999.
89. See Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between Intellectual
Property Policy and UCITA are Likely to be Resolved, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 753 (1999) ("The
essence of the issue lies in UCITA's seeming invitation for companies to construct
their own intellectual property rules through contract, creating a potential for
conflict with intellectual property policy."). See generally J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
875 (1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827 (1998); Mark A.
Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
90. See Nimmer, supra note 69, at 232-33.
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tion" and which "cannot and should not be resolved as a matter of state contract law."9 Therefore, "UCITA adopts a neutral position with respect to what, ultimately, are issues of
federal and international policy."92
Proponents of the view that UCITA must address the
relationship of contract and intellectual property law policies to
prevent circumvention of those policies by contract argued,
however, that UCITA's status as a contract statute did not
resolve the question of whether its provisions had an impact on
the strong public policies reflected in intellectual property law.
They asserted that rules in UCITA which are purely contractual in nature-provisions relating to how and when a contract is
formed, and whether contract terms received after payment
become part of the contract-could have a profound impact on
U.S. intellectual property policy. By validating and facilitating
the use of shrinkwrap licenses, they argued these provisions
would allow licensors to circumvent the fundamental public
policies regarding innovation, competition and free expression
and the careful balancing of interests those policies represent
with a "private contractual ordering of intellectual property
rights,"93 which, because shrinkwrap licenses are standard
form contracts, could be built into a type of private intellectual
property legislation, one contract at a time.94

91. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Samuelson & Opsahl, supra note 89, at 758.
94. See id.
UCITA provides a structure for private contractual ordering of intellectual
property rights. This private ordering can have the effect of private legislation if certain agreements (or terms) become ubiquitous (or nearly so)
in contracts. It is especially troublesome if the contract attempts to override a public policy rule that would otherwise apply, and if contracts of
adhesion become standardized throughout the industry, removing the
freedom element of freedom of contract.
Id. Samuelson & Opsahl use the example of reverse engineering to illustrate their

point:
For example, anti-decompilation clauses in software contracts seek to
prevent reverse engineering that would otherwise be permissible. If every
contract contained a prohibition on decompiling software, then a perfectly
legal act could be rendered de facto illegal, despite the two-party nature
of each individual contract . . . . "[Wihen the restored power of the twoparty deal in the digital universe is combined with the power to impose
non-negotiated terms, it produces contracts (not 'agreements') that are
roughly equivalent to private legislation that is valid against the world."
Id. (quoting Reichman & Franklin, supra note 89, at 911).
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The debate about the extent to which UCITA should address the intersection of contract and intellectual property law
was resolved in the UCITA drafting process through the addition of section 105(b), which gives the forum the power to refuse to enforce a term of a contract that violates a fundamental
public policy "to the extent that the interest in enforcement is
clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of
the term."95 Comment 3 states that "[the... public policies
most likely to be applicable to transactions within this Act are
96
those relating to innovation, competition, and fair comment."
Although the UCITA drafters continue to take the position
that UCITA is neutral with regard to the relationship of contract and intellectual property law, as Professor Ray Nimmer
has noted, subsection 105(b) "provides a basis for a case-bycase resolution of the myriad issues" that question raises. 97
Whichever side one takes in the debate over the extent to
which UCITA should address the relationship between contract
and intellectual property law, for present purposes, the important thing is the existence of the debate. The debate over
UCITA illustrates that even when a dispute involves an issue
of contract law, the fact that the subject matter of a software
license is intellectual property means that important public
policies of interested jurisdictions are implicated in a way that
they are not with regard to the normal contract to sell goods or
perform services. While software contracts may be instances of
private ordering between two individuals, they are private
ordering with strong public policy implications for society in
general.
Further, the extent of the disagreement and debate over
these issues within one jurisdiction dealing with a single set of
federal intellectual property policies underlines how much
more potential there is for conflict once one enters the international setting, where different interested jurisdictions may
have conflicting public policies, and where the jurisdiction
whose law will be applied to the contract aspects of the transaction and the jurisdiction creating the underlying rights may
not be the same. The important public policy decisions encoded

95. UCITA § 105(b) (2000).
96. Id. cmt. 3.
97. Nimmer, supra note 69, at 231. For further discussion of section 105(b)
see infra Part V, discussing the UCITA choice-of-law provision.
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into each jurisdiction's intellectual property laws and the perceived potential for the terms of a software license to have
adverse effects on those public policies, suggest that choice-oflaw rules in this area must pay more attention to choice-of-law
principles that emphasize the concerns of interested jurisdictions than do choice-of-law rules with regard to other types of
contracts. Choice-of-law rules for all contracts must consider
the concerns of interested jurisdictions, particularly with regard to mandatory rules of those jurisdictions, such as those
dealing with consumer protection." Choice-of-law rules for
software licenses, however, must deal not only with the contract-related concerns of interested jurisdictions, but also with
their intellectual property-related concerns, a group of concerns
which, because of the nature of software licenses, are potentially implicated by every software license, not just those involving
certain parties or certain types of transactions.
One can predict, therefore, that the public policy exception
and the concept of mandatory rules, which allow the forum to
override the otherwise applicable law, will have a heightened
significance in this area. Further, because policies in this area
are not only important to the respective jurisdictions involved,
but also vary between jurisdictions, systemic concerns will be
an important consideration as well. These concerns will need
to be addressed through placing careful limits on the use of
public policy and mandatory rules when applied to favor the
forum. As discussed above, when public policy and mandatory
rules provisions are designed only with a view towards protecting the interests of the forum, then they devalue the systemic
concerns with regard to mutual respect and cooperation, and
thus invite retaliation by other interested jurisdictions. Therefore, the extent to which the forum should apply public policy
and mandatory rules principles in favor of other interested
jurisdictions also must considered, as that application furthers
the systemic interests in mutual respect and cooperation.
Further, because public policy and mandatory rules over-

98. This concern is not insubstantial. See, e.g., Erauw, supra note 59, at 74-79
(discussing European mandatory consumer protection rules); Directive 97/7/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Ma 1997 on the protection of
consumers in respect of distance contracts, art. 12, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (providing
consumer rights conferred are nonwaivable and directing member states to take
measures needed to ensure consumer does not lose protection by virtue of choice
of law of non-member country).
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ride the law chosen by the parties by contract, one can predict
that contractual choice-of-law rules cannot be relied upon to
ensure certainty and predictability in this area to the extent
that they can in other types of contracts. As discussed in Part
III, the ability of the parties to choose applicable law by contract ultimately depends on the willingness of the forum to
enforce their choice-of-law clause. Normally, enforcement of
such a clause would not be problematic because the
jurisdiction's interests will not be implicated in any significant
way by the parties' private ordering of their relationship. Once
such an interest is implicated, however, the enforceability of
the choice-of-law provision is doubtful. The interests of a state
can be implicated with regard to any type of contract by some
contract-related problem, such as lack of consent or unconscionability, which would cause the forum to deny effect to the
choice-of-law provision. Such contract-related concerns, however, are likely to arise in only a relatively few contracts, and
thus, the parties to most contracts can rely on the choice-of-law
clause in planning their transaction. The nature of the product
involved in an intellectual property transaction, however,
means that state interests potentially are implicated by every
software license, and the ability of the parties to rely on their
choice of law is concomitantly reduced.
If the prediction that party autonomy may not prevail in
this area to the extent it does with regard to other contracts is
an accurate one, this suggests the parties' planning interests
in certainty and predictability will need to be taken into account in some other fashion. It thus seems appropriate to consider whether jurisdiction-selecting rules may be more important in this area than with regard to normal contract choice-oflaw rules, at least with regard to some issues, as a multilateral
approach not only values certainty and predictability, but systemic interests as well. With this thought, however, we return
full-circle. Multilateralist approaches only work to the extent
that the jurisdiction selected by the rules to govern a particular issue is one acceptable to potential fora within the choiceof-law system. The strong public policy concerns of interested
jurisdictions implicated by software licenses suggest, however,
that consensus on jurisdiction-selecting rules may be difficult
to reach. 9
99. Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1206 (noting that one reason for the
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Consider a variation on the hypothetical discussed in the
section on characterization. The copyright law of Jurisdiction A
provides that licensees may reproduce the *software's object
code and translate its form when the decompilation is necessary to achieve interoperability, and that this right to
decompile cannot be excluded by contract. The software license
prohibits reverse-engineering for any purpose. The software
license also contains a choice-of-law clause choosing the law of
Jurisdiction B. Contract provisions prohibiting reverse-engineering are consistent with the copyright law of Jurisdiction B.
Both licensor and licensee are nationals of Jurisdiction A. The
licensee decompiles the software to achieve interoperability in
Jurisdiction A. The licensor files suit in Jurisdiction B for
breach of the license. Should Jurisdiction B apply its own law
pursuant to the choice-of-law clause and enforce the absolute
prohibition on reverse-engineering? Or, should it recognize and
enforce the mandatory rule of Jurisdiction A prohibiting this
type of contract provision?
Applying its own law to enforce the prohibition on reverseengineering would further the planning-related interests of the
parties in certainty and predictability, and in the ability to
choose a substantively favorable law. It also would serve the
expectation and fairness interests of at least one party to the
transaction, as the existence of the choice-of-law clause indicates that it was efficient for at least the drafter of the license
to take choice of law into account in structuring the transaction. As discussed in Part II, whether enforcing the choice-oflaw clause serves the expectation and fairness interests of the
other party depends on the nature of the transaction. Enforcing the contractual choice of law also would further Jurisdiction B's own public policy with regard to the appropriate balancing of protection and free access reflected in its copyright
statute.
On the other hand, recognizing the mandatory rule of
Jurisdiction A would further Jurisdiction A's interest in controlling activities within its borders, as well as its interest in
its domiciliaries and in effectuating the policies embodied in its

abandonment of multilateralism in the United States was "the rise of the regulatory state, which led to more caustic public policy differences among jurisdictions,
and which pressured the interested forum to apply local regulations whenever
possible").
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copyright statute. Recognition of the mandatory rule also
would further the systemic goals of mutual respect, cooperation, and uniformity of application. One also can argue that Jurisdiction B's interest in furthering its copyright policy in this
instance is not particularly strong, as Jurisdiction B would not
have entertained an infringement action in this case because
none of the acts took place in Jurisdiction B. Further, if Jurisdiction B refuses to recognize the mandatory rule of Jurisdiction A, then the parties to the software license will be allowed
to circumvent the mandatory rules of their common domicile
by contract. Because Jurisdiction A clearly would have denied
enforcement to the reverse-engineering provision if the licensor
had file suit in Jurisdiction A, Jurisdiction B's failure to apply
the mandatory rule also will lead to forum-shopping, and may
lead to retaliation by Jurisdiction A through its refusal to
recognize the mandatory rules and strong public policies of
Jurisdiction B in similar situations.
The above hypothetical is deliberately simplistic: all of the
parties' contacts relevant to the transaction appear to be in
Jurisdiction A, and Jurisdiction A's interests are clearly implicated, while Jurisdiction B's interests do not appear to be implicated to any great extent. The conflict in the hypothetical
thus is primarily one between the planning interests of at least
one, and perhaps both of the parties on one side, and the interests of Jurisdiction A and of the international choice-of-law
system on the other. Real choice-of-law issues regarding software licenses are likely to be much more complex. This simple
hypothetical, however, illustrates a conflict of interests that is
likely to arise in many different guises with regard to software
licenses. Should the forum favor the planning interests of at
least one (and maybe both) of the parties to the license, or
should it favor the interests of the interested jurisdiction and
the choice-of-law system as a whole by applying the mandatory
rule of Jurisdiction A? In this case, it seems clear that the
mandatory rule of Jurisdiction A should be applied.
V. ANALYSIS OF UCITA SECTION 109
Unlike most of the existing choice-of-law rules designed to
deal with contract issues, the choice-of-law rules contained in
section 109 of UCITA are designed specifically for contracts
involving intellectual property. This section analyzes the
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UCITA choice-of-law rule in terms of the framework suggested
by this Article's previous discussion.
As with most modern choice-of-law rules, UCITA's choiceof-law provision is fairly eclectic; rather than adopting a particular approach to choice of law, such as multilateralism or center of gravity, its provisions combine the various choice-of-law
rules discussed in Part III to obtain a more particularized
balance of the relevant interests. The main features of section
109 are: (1) a broad authorization for the parties to choose
applicable law by agreement; (2) jurisdiction-selecting rules for
determining applicable law in the absence of choice in certain
situations; (3) a center of gravity approach for situations not
covered by the jurisdiction-selecting provisions; (4) consideration of mandatory rules of another jurisdiction, as well as of
the forum in certain situations; and, (5) a public policy exception limited to situations in which the law otherwise chosen is
the law of a country other than the United States. Each of
these features is discussed below.
A.

Choice of Law by Contract

Subsection 109(a) provides that "[t]he Parties in their
agreement may choose the applicable law."' The provision
does not require that the law chosen be related to either the
parties or the transaction, but does make the contractual
choice in a consumer contract subject to the mandatory rules of
the jurisdiction whose law would be chosen in the absence of
contractual choice under the other provisions of section 109.
Comment 2 states:
The information economy accentuates the[ I importance [of
contractual choice of law provisions] because it allows remote
parties to enter and perform contracts spanning multiple
jurisdictions and operating in circumstances that do not depend on physical location of either party or the information.
Subsection (a) enables small companies to actively engage in
multinational business; if the agreement could not designate
applicable law, even the smallest business could be subject to
the law of all fifty states and all countries in the world. That
would impose large costs and uncertainty on an otherwise

100. UCITA § 109 (2000).

20001

CHOICE-OF-LAWFRAMEWORK

161

efficient
system of commerce; it would raise barriers to en1
10

try.

The comment indicates that limits on contractual choice of law
based on a reasonable relationship to the jurisdiction whose
law is selected were rejected as "inappropriate, especially in
cyberspace transactions where physical locations are often
irrelevant or not knowable." 10 2 Finally, the comment notes
that "in global commerce, parties may appropriately wish to
select a neutral forum because neither is familiar with the law
of the other's jurisdiction." °3 Thus, except for this last rationale, the primary rationales for UCITA's broad authorization
of contractual choice of law are based on the characteristics of
Internet4 commerce and the needs of Internet entrepreneurs.

0

1. Exception for Mandatory Rules of the Jurisdiction Whose
Law Would Otherwise Apply
The focus of subsection 109(a) on the needs of electronic
commerce is underlined by the one textual limit on contractual
choice in subsection 109(a), which provides that the contractual
"choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract 5 to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement
under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply" in
the absence of contractual choice under UCITA's default
rules.' These rules are set out in subsections 109(b) and (c).
Under subsection 109(b)(1), access contracts and contracts that
"provid[e] for electronic delivery of a copy"-the types of contracts most likely to be involved in Internet transactions-are

101. Id. § 109 cmt. 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Although the rationales for the contractual choice provision focus primarily
on the needs of electronic commerce, the broad contractual choice-of-law provision
applies to all transactions, not just those conducted electronically.
105. "Consumer contract" is defined as "a contract between a merchant licensor
and a consumer." Id. § 102(a)(16). A "consumer" is "an individual who is a licensee
of information or informational rights that the individual at the time of contracting intended to be used primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Id.
§102(a)(15). A "merchant" is a person that, inter alia, "deals in information or
informational rights of the kind involved in the transaction." Id. § 102(a)(45).
106. Id. § 109(a).
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governed by "the law of the jurisdiction in which the licensor
was located when the agreement was entered into." °7 The
licensor's "location" is not necessarily the licensor's physical
location; rather, it is (depending on the circumstances) its
"place of business," "chief executive office," "place of incorporation or primary registration," or "primary residence." °8 Thus,
when software is delivered in an electronic transaction, the
parties' contractual choice of law in a consumer contract is only
subject to any applicable mandatory rules of the licensor's
jurisdiction.
The comments refer to this mandatory rules exception as

"a consumer protection rule[

],""9

and state that the "funda-

mental policy of freedom of contract should not permit overriding the consumer rule if a state, having addressed the cost and
benefits to all parties, determines that the consumer rule is
not waivable by contract.""' Normally, one would assume
that an exception to party autonomy in favor of mandatory
consumer rules would be designed to address the expectation
and fairness concerns of parties for whom it is not efficient to
consider choice of law in making contracts, as consumers are
often used as a rough approximation of that group. Further, a
mandatory rules exception requiring application of the law of
an interested jurisdiction other than the forum usually serves
both the interests of that jurisdiction and systemic interests in
cooperation and mutual respect. As applied to electronic commerce, however, the consumer exception in subsection 109(a)
does not appear to. be designed primarily to address either the
expectation and fairness concerns of the consumer licensee or
the concerns of jurisdictions that have an interest in the application of their mandatory consumer protection rules. Party
expectation and fairness interests are not served because the
consumer is most likely to expect that the law of her residence
would apply. Similarly, one would assume that the jurisdiction
with the most interest in having its mandatory consumer rules
apply would be the jurisdiction in which the consumer resides.
Other choice-of-law regimes that contain limits on party autonomy in a consumer context appear to be based on this assumption.'
107. Id. § 109(b)(1).

108. Id. § 109(d).
109. Id. § 109 cmt. 1.

110. Id. § 109(a) cmt. 2b.
111. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 5(1) (a choice of law made
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Instead, in the electronic commerce area, the primary
interests served by subsection 109(a) appear to be the interests
of the licensor in avoiding the costs associated with becoming
familiar with the mandatory rules of jurisdictions in which it
licenses software to consumers, and in obtaining certainty and
predictability through contractual choice of law. The application of the mandatory rules exception in the electronic commerce context to apply the mandatory rules of the licensor's
jurisdiction means that, at most, the licensor need only become
familiar with the law of two jurisdictions-the law of the jurisdiction selected by the contractual choice-of-law provision and
the law of its jurisdiction of residence. Further, because in a
consumer contract the licensor is likely to make the decision as
to the applicable law chosen by the license, the licensor can, if
it chooses, restrict applicable law solely to that of its own jurisdiction. Thus, the consumer exception appears to remove licensor costs that otherwise might be associated with Internet
commerce.
The overriding concern of the UCITA choice-of-law rules
with certainty and predictability in electronic transactions is
underlined by the significantly different treatment of the mandatory rules exception outside of that context. The default
choice-of-law rule to which subsection 109(a) likely will refer
outside of the electronic commerce context states that "[a]
consumer contract that requires delivery of a copy on a tangible medium is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the copy is or should have been delivered to the consumer.""1
In the contractual choice-of-law context, this rule would mean
that the contractual choice-of-law provision would not be enforceable to the extent of a mandatory rule of the state where
the tangible copy is or should have been delivered, which often

by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he
has his habitual residence" in certain circumstances); U.C.C. § 2A-106(1) (1995) ("If
the law chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is that of a jurisdiction other
than a jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement
becomes enforceable or within 30 days thereafter or in which the goods are to be
used, the choice is not enforceable."); U.C.C. § 1-301(b) (ALI Council Draft, Nov.
22, 1999) (choice-of-law provision is not enforceable if one party is a consumer
unless the law chosen is either law of the State or country in which consumer
resides or in which consideration flowing to consumer is to be received or used).
112. UCITA § 109(b)(2) (2000).
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will coincide with the consumer's residence. Thus, once one
moves outside of the context of electronic delivery of software,
the consumer exception does seem moire likely to give some
weight to expectation and fairness concerns, as well as the
concerns of a jurisdiction likely to have a strong interest in
having its mandatory consumer rules applied."'
2. Mandatory Rules of the Forum
Comment 2 indicates that parties' contractual choice of
law under subsection 109(a) also is subject to two limits based
on mandatory rules of the forum: (1) "general limitations such
as the doctrine of unconscionability;" and, (2) the public policy
exception in UCITA section 105."4 Comment 2 states that
"agreed choice of law terms" are subject to the unconscionability provision."' Thus, the intention seems to be to apply unconscionability doctrine and similar limits only to the choice-oflaw term itself, rather than to make them generally applicable
to the terms of the license.
The fundamental public policy exception, on the other
hand, would allow the forum to deny enforcement to all or part
of a contract "to the extent that the interest in enforcement is
clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of
the term.""' As discussed in Part IV above, subsection 105(b)
represents UCITA's resolution of the issue of the relationship
between contract terms and the public policies expressed in
U.S. and state intellectual property law. Its focus, therefore, is
on "policies that implicate the broader public interest and the
balance between enforcing private transactions and the need to
protect the public domain of information," and, in particular,
"those relating to innovation, competition, and fair comment."" 7 Comment 3 indicates that section 105 is not intended to apply to purely contract law issues, such as contract
formation."' Applied as a mandatory rule in the choice-of-law
113. Comment 3 states that this rule "adopts, for the consumer, the location

that is most likely to be consistent with the consumer's expectations. It avoids
surprise to the provider because the tangible copy is, by definition, to be delivered
into that state." Id. cmt. 3.
114. Id. cmt. 2b.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 105(b).
117. Id. cmt. 3.
118. Id.
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context, section 105 presumably will allow the forum to refuse
to enforce a term of a software license enforceable under the
law chosen by the parties because enforcement of that term
violates forum policies related to intellectual property, including policies embodied in federal intellectual property laws and
the Constitution."'
Mandatory rules of the forum value the interest of the
forum in enforcing its policies over the planning related interests of the parties. The mandatory forum rules in UCITA section 109 will allow the forum to deny enforcement to the
choice-of-law provision itself based on the forum's determination that under its standards of fairness the contractual choice
of law is unconscionable. 20 Further, application of section

119. Comment 3 to section 105 states that:
Under the general principle in subsection (b), courts . . . may look to federal copyright and patent laws for guidance on what types of limitations
on the rights of owners of information ordinarily seem appropriate, recognizing, however, that private parties ordinarily have sound commercial
reasons for contracting for limitations on use and that enforcing private
ordering arrangements in itself reflects a fundamental public policy enacted throughout the Uniform Commercial Code and common law.
Id. The comment also lists a variety of factors to be considered in applying the
section,
including the extent to which enforcement or invalidation of the term will
adversely affect the interests of each party to the transaction or the
public, the interest in protecting expectations arising from the contract,
the purpose of the challenged term, the extent to which enforcement or
invalidation will adversely affect other fundamental public interests, the
strength and consistency of judicial decisions applying similar policies in
similar contexts, the nature of any express legislative or regulatory policies, and the values of certainty of enforcement and uniformity in interpreting contractual provisions.
Id. The comment further states that the fact the parties have negotiated terms of
their agreement also should make the court more reluctant to set aside terms of
the contract, and "[in] light of the national and international integration of the
digital environment, courts should be reluctant to invalidate terms based on purely
local policies." Id.
120. Application of the unconscionability rule also may protect the expectation
and fairness concerns of the party found to be subject to a contract of adhesion,
although it does so under the forum's own standards of what those interests require. In this regard, one can compare UCITA with other choice-of-law regimes in
which decisions about the substantive validity of a contract generally are governed
by the law that would apply if the contract were valid, and in some instances by
the law of the domicile of the party claiming invalidity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 198 (capacity to contract governed
by law otherwise chosen, but if there is capacity under the law of party's domicile
contract usually will be upheld); id. § 201 (effect of misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence and mistake governed by law otherwise chosen); Rome Convention,
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105 will allow the forum to deny enforcement to any terms of
the license that are inconsistent with the forum's fundamental
public policy embodied in its intellectual property law. Therefore, these mandatory rules lessen to some degree the focus of
subsection 109(a) on the planning-related interests of the parties, such as certainty and predictability and the ability of the
parties to choose a substantively favorable law.
B.

Choice of Law in Absence of Agreement

Subsection 109(b) sets forth the choice-of-law rules to be
applied by the forum in the absence of an enforceable contractual choice-of-law provision. As discussed above, subsection
109(b) contains two jurisdiction-selecting rules based on the
method of delivery of the software. The law of the licensor's
domicile/residence, or legal equivalent, governs access contracts
and contracts "providing for electronic delivery of a
copy"'--a category that roughly, although not completely,
corresponds with contracts made by electronic means.'22 The

supra note 27, art. 8 (existence and validity of contract or its terms governed by
law that would apply if the contract or term was valid, except a party may rely
on the law of his habitual residence to establish lack of consent if under circumstances that law should apply). In his discussion of a similar provision in Article
10(1) of the 1985 Hague Convention, Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Done at the Hague, Oct. 30, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1573, Professor 2eljko Matid notes that, while applying the law that
would apply if the contract were valid rather than the law of the forum seems
circular, the justification is grounded in protecting the parties' interests in certainty and predictability:
[Tihe application of the lex fori, which would be the only "logical" solution to the problem, would create uncertainty at least until the court
settled the matter of whether their choice in law was valid. Since the
parties can only guess, without knowing for sure which law will be the
lex fori, the "illogical" solution becomes a practical one.
Zeljko Mati6, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the
InternationalSale of Goods-Rules on the Applicable Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 59, at 51, 62-63. The recognition of
the relevance of the law of the complaining party's domicile to these issues suggests that a recognition of the interests of that jurisdiction also underlies these
rules.
121. UCITA § 109(b)(1) (2000).
122. The section only roughly corresponds to electronic contracting because it
defines its scope in terms of the method of delivery rather than the method of
contracting. It is certainly possible to contract through some means other than the
Internet, such as, for example, through a telephone call, but have the software
delivered electronically. Similarly, it is possible to contract on the Internet for
software that is to be delivered on a tangible medium. The comments, however,
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law of the jurisdiction "in which the copy is or should have
been delivered to the consumer" governs consumer contracts
"that require[ I delivery of a copy on a physical medium."12 3
For cases not governed by these two jurisdiction-selecting provisions, UCITA applies a "center of gravity" approach--"the
contract is governed by the law of the jurisdiction having the
most significant relationship to the transaction."2 4
1. Selection of the Licensor's Jurisdiction to Govern in Cases
of Electronic Delivery
As discussed in Part IV, the nature of the "product" in
software licensing indicates that jurisdictions will more often
find their public policies and mandatory rules implicated by
software licenses than by other contracts. Thus, the parties'
use of contractual choice of law to provide certainty and predictability in this area may not be as effective as it would be
with regard to normal contracts. Therefore, the need for jurisdiction-selecting rules allocating competence with regard to
certain issues in a way acceptable to the members of the
choice-of-law system in order to obtain certainty and predictability on a systemic level may be greater with regard to software licenses than with regard to other types of contracts."
Section 109 adopts this type of "belts and suspenders"
approach to attaining certainty and predictability in the area
of electronic contracting by providing both a broad authorization for choice of law by contract and a bright line rule selecting the law of the licensor's jurisdiction in the absence of effective choice for contracts providing for electronic delivery of a
copy. The rationale for a bright line rule, however, is not based
on the need to obtain certainty and predictability within the
international choice-of-law system, but rather on the special
needs of licensors engaging in electronic commerce:
Contracts in computer information can be created and performed remotely, a factor encouraging the need for tailored

indicate that the provision is intended to deal with electronic contracting, even
though it speaks in terms of electronic delivery. Id. cmt. 3 (subsection (b)(1) deals
with electronic commerce).
123. Id. § 109(b)(2).
124. Id. § 109(b)(3).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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and understandable rules that enhance certainty and thus
facilitate global commerce.
Subsection (b)(1) specifies that, in an access contract or a
contract involving electronic delivery of information, in the
absence of an agreed choice of law, the agreement is governed
by the law of the jurisdiction in which the licensor is located.
Any other rule would require that the information provider
(small or large) comply with the law of all states and all
countries, since it may not be clear or even knowable where
the contract is formed or the information sent. The rule
adopted here enhances certainty in a context where an online vendor, large or small, makes Internet access available
to the entire world.12
As with the primary rationales for broad contractual choice of
law, the rationale for selecting the licensor's jurisdiction is
based on two characteristics of Internet transactions: (1) it is
possible to deal with someone on the Internet without knowing
that person's physical location; and, (2) information on the
Internet is simultaneously provided to all jurisdictions.'2 7
If the licensor indeed had no ability to know the location of
the licensee, and no ability to limit the jurisdictions in which it
licenses software, then serious notice concerns would be raised
by subjecting the licensor to the law of the licensee's jurisdiction. Thus, the licensor's fairness and expectation concerns
would be added to its planning concerns in justifying a bright
line rule selecting the law of the licensor's jurisdiction. In fact,
however, the licensor can control the extent to which it knows
the location of its licensees, as well as the extent to which it

126. UCITA § 109(b)(1) cmt. 3 (2000).
127. These rationales echo to some extent arguments made by David R. Johnson and David Post in their article Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, as rationales for why sovereigns should refrain from regulation of the
Internet in deference to self-regulation by Internet service providers and users.
Johnson & Post, supra note 67, at 1367. Johnson and Post argue that because
"It]he Net enables transactions between people who do not know, and in many
cases cannot know, each other's physical location," id. at 1371, and because information on the World Wide Web is simultaneously available to anyone with a connection to the Internet, territorially-based regulation would both subject all
Internet activity simultaneously to the laws of all territorial sovereigns, id. at
1374-75, and create serious fairness problems because individuals would not have
notice that their activity would subject them to the laws of distant places, id. at
1375. They therefore urge that we take the "space" in the term "cyberspace" literally, and recognize the Internet as a distinct, although, virtual world "that needs
and can create its own law and legal institutions." Id. at 1367.
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does business in a particular jurisdiction, thus subjecting itself
to the application of that jurisdiction's laws. The licensor can
determine the location of its licensee by conditioning access to
its Website, or at least to the portion of it on which licensing
agreements are entered, on the licensee providing information
about its location. 2 ' Indeed, in commercial transactions, such
as those involving software licenses, the likelihood that the
licensor will have incentives to condition access on the provision of information about the licensee is quite high. Aside from
the fact that it is a good business practice to know certain
basic information about persons with which one does business,
the independent commercial value that information about
those visiting Websites increasingly has today would seem
likely to motivate the licensor to obtain as much information
about the licensee as possible. Further, licensors will need to
obtain this type of information in order to avoid liability under
the regulatory rules of various jurisdictions.'2 9
With this information about the licensee's location, the
licensor then can make a determination as to whether it wants
to subject itself to the application of that jurisdiction's laws. It
can either provide the potential licensee with information modified to comply with the regulations of that particular jurisdiction, or deny access to the Website if the licensor does not wish
to be exposed to the law of that jurisdiction.13
The licensor's ability to control the extent to which it engages in transactions with individuals in unknown locations
through controls on access, as well as, increasingly, through
more sophisticated technology,1 ' means that, at least from
the licensor's perspective, Internet transactions are not that

128. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1226-27.
129. For example, the European Union Data Protection Directive may require
Internet sites collecting personal data about visitors from the EU countries to be
treated differently in order to conform with its provisions. See Amelia Boss, The
Jurisdiction of the Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law
and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INTL
LAW. 1067, 1070 (1998).
130. See id.
131. Other, more sophisticated forms of information discrimination technology
also are available. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1224-27 (discussing available
technologies). Professor Goldsmith predicts that "the techniques and technologies
for controlling cyberspace information flows will continue to develop in scope and
sophistication, and will play an important role in resolving the jurisdictional quandaries presented by the 'borderless' medium." Id at 1228.
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different from other multi-jurisdiction transactions for purposes of choice of law. Internet transactions often do present serious choice-of-law problems: problems of complexity with regard
to how to choose a single governing law for activity having
multi-jurisdictional contacts, and problems of situs in determining 'how to choose governing law when the locus of activity
cannot easily be pinpointed in geographical space."132 These
problems, however, do not distinguish software licensing transactions from many other multi-jurisdictional transactions.
They do not explain, for example, why a licensor should not be
subject to the law of jurisdictions in which it licenses software,
just as a seller of goods or the publisher of a newspaper may
be subject to the law of all states in which the goods are sold
or the paper is distributed. 3 ' If, like these entrepreneurs of
tangible items, the licensor can control its exposure to unwanted law by refusing to engage in transactions in a jurisdiction,
then, in both situations there is a deliberate choice to engage
in transactions in the jurisdiction. Thus, the benefits gained
from those transactions would seem to make it fair to apply
the law of that jurisdiction to those transactions in both situations.' Nor does the size of the licensor seem to provide a
rationale for not applying the law of jurisdictions in which the
licensor deliberately chooses to do business. The size of a particular commercial enterprise alone has never provided an
independent rationale for denying the application of otherwise
applicable law. As with other entrepreneurs, the issue becomes
the extent to which choice-of-law costs should be placed on
those doing business in multiple jurisdictions.
This does not necessarily mean that a rule applying the
law of the licensor's jurisdiction in all Internet software licenses cannot be justified. It simply means that such a rule cannot
be justified in terms of the need to give more weight to the
fairness and expectation interests of the licensor because of the
unique characteristics of the Internet. Certainty and predictability are important values in all contractual transactions,
and, as this Article has suggested above, in the area of international software licensing, obtaining certainty and predict-

132. Id. at 1234.
133. See id. at 1230.
134. Cf id. at 1241 (noting the applicability of a reciprocal benefits analysis to
territorial regulation of Internet service providers).
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ability through jurisdiction-selecting rules is a particularly
worthy goal. Certainty and predictability within a forum can
be obtained through any bright line rule; however, in order to
obtain certainty and predictability within a choice-of-law system, the particular rule must be one acceptable to at least
most jurisdictions within the system.
Does the rule allocating substantive law competence to the
licensor's jurisdiction when software is delivered electronically
have the potential to become an accepted rule in the international choice-of-law system? Some precedent for the rule can be
found in the Rome Convention. In applying its general principle that, absent contractual choice, the contract is governed by
the law of the jurisdiction "with which it is most closely connected," the Rome Convention creates a presumption "that the
contract is most closely connected with the country where the
party who is to effect the performance which is characteristic
of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract,
his habitual residence or, in the case of a body corporate or
unincorporate, its central administration.""5 The characteristic performance under a contract is not the payment of money,
but "the performance for which the payment is due, i.e. depending on the type of contract, the delivery of goods, the
granting of the right to make use of an item of property, the
provision of a service... etc., which usually constitutes the
centre of gravity and the socio-economic function of the contractual transaction." 3 ' Therefore, the characteristic performance concept often will result in, application of the law of the
seller's jurisdiction in a goods transaction, and, arguably
should result in application of
the law of a licensor's jurisdic1 37
transaction.
licensing
a
tion in

135. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(2). Article 4 goes on to state that:
[I]f the contract is entered into in the course of that party's trade or
profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal place
of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the
performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the
principal place of business, the country in which that other place of business is situated.
Id.
136. Report on the Convention, supra note 45, at 20.
137. Indeed, the Proposed Rules, which were developed by Professor Eugen
Ulmer to supplement the Rome Convention with regard to intellectual property
issues, often treat the licensor's performance as the "characteristic performance"
under the license, and thus point to application of the licensor's jurisdiction for
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Two differences between the Rome Convention concept of
characteristic performance and the UCITA rule applying the
law of the licensor's jurisdiction suggest, however, that
UCITA's rule may not be acceptable as an international standard, at least in its current absolute form. First, unlike the
UCITA rule, the concept of characteristic performance is a
rebuttable presumption, not an absolute rule. It only applies in
the absence of a showing that "from the circumstances as a
whole ...

the contract is more closely connected with another

country."13 Further, perhaps in recognition that the characteristic performance presumption often will lead to application
of the law of the stronger party, it does not apply at all to certain consumer contracts, and individual employment contracts.
Instead, in those situations, the "law of the country in which
the consumer has his habitual residence,"'39 and "the law of
the country in which the employee habitually carries out his
work in performance of the contract" 40 apply.
Second, although the Rome Convention rules were designed in light of modern technological advances, such as contracts by telex, which make use of more traditional jurisdiction-selecting criteria, such as the place of formation, difficult
to apply,' they were not designed in light of Internet techissues relating to contract. Proposed Article F(2) states that:
The obligations of the author or of his successor in interest shall be
regarded as the characteristic obligation within the meaning of Article
4(2). There shall, however, be a general presumption that contracts under
which the grantee undertakes to exploit the work or exercise rights
therein, and instruments pursuant to which an exclusive right is assigned
or granted to him in order for the work to be exploited, shall be regarded as more closely connected with the State in which the grantee's place
of business is located ....
ULMER, supra note 73, at 100. These rules were to be treated as guidelines, which
could be overridden by a finding that a different state has the closest connection.
Id at 51.
138. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(5).
139. Id. art. 5(3).
140. Id. art. 6(2)(a). Unlike the consumer provision, the employee provision is
not absolute. If the employee does not habitually carry out his work in one country, then the law of the country in which the place of business through which he
was engaged is located controls. Id, art. 6(2)(b). Further, if "from the circumstances as a whole . . . the contract is more closely connected with another country,"
then that country's law applies. Id. art. 6(2).
141. See Jayme, supra note 63, at 43 (noting that modem technology has made
it difficult to determine the place where the contract was concluded, "rendering the
place of formation of the contract an arbitrary and meaningless connection"); Report on the Convention, supra note 45, at 21 (noting that the "characteristic per-
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nology. As discussed above," the fact that it is possible for
an Internet transaction to be conducted without the parties
knowing each other's locations does not seem significant as a
factor in deciding whether the licensor's interests should be
given greater weight in adopting a choice-of-law rule because
the licensor has ready means of determining the location of the
licensee, as well as significant incentives to do so. On the other
hand, the likelihood that the licensee engaging in an Internet
transaction will know the "place of business," "chief executive
office," "place of incorporation or primary registration," or "primary residence"'
of the licensor, unless the licensor provides that information on its Website, may be quite small, thus
raising serious questions about expectations and fairness in
the application of the UCITA rule. The extent to which these
expectation and fairness concerns are implicated would need to
be explored before such a rule was adopted as an international
norm.
2. Jurisdiction-Selecting Rule in Consumer Contracts
Jurisdiction-selecting rules for consumer contracts are an
increasingly common feature in contract choice-of-law regimes.
The particular bright line rule in UCITA section 109, providing
that a consumer contract requiring delivery on a tangible medium is governed by the law of the "jurisdiction in which the
copy is or should have been delivered to the consumer," however, is not as uniformly accepted. The Second Restatement indicates that the jurisdiction of delivery usually will govern with
regard to sales of chattels, but this is neither a special consumer rule, nor a bright line rule.' Other U.S. choice-of-law
regimes applying bright line consumer rules use the
consumer's residence or the place of use.'45 The Rome Con-

formance" idea simplifies the determination of applicable law, rendering the place
where the act was done, the place where the contract was concluded, "with all the
difficulties and the problems of classification that arise in practice," and the place
of performance "superfluous").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 127-134.
143. UCITA § 109(d) (2000) (defining location of the licensor).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 191 (contract
to sell an interest in a chattel is governed by the law of the state where seller is
to deliver the chattel unless some other state has a more significant relationship).
145. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-106(1) (1995) (limiting contractual choice to the
consumer's residence or jurisdiction in which the goods will be used). Draft Re-

174

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XXVI:I

vention also focuses on the law of the consumer's residence,
rather than the place of delivery.'46 Thus, the potential for
this particular rule to be adopted on a system-wide basis
47
1
seems somewhat uncertain.

3. Most Significant Relationship
Subsection 109(b)(3) provides that in cases not covered by
the jurisdiction-selecting rules-that is, cases that do not involve electronic delivery and do not involve consumer contracts--"the contract is governed by the law of the jurisdiction
having the most significant relationship to the transaction."48 As discussed in Part III, a center of gravity approach
de-emphasizes certainty and predictability in favor of allowing
the forum to consider the concerns of interested jurisdictions,
as well as the fairness and expectation interests of the parties,
on a case by case basis.'49 UCITA's particular center of gravity approach, however, shows a somewhat remarkable lack of
concern for certainty and predictability, particularly when contrasted with the overriding focus of UCITA's electronic commerce choice-of-law rules on those concerns. Other center of
gravity approaches give textual guidelines for the forum's determination of the center of gravity. The Restatement Second,
for example, contains both general principles15 ° and specific

vised Article One contains a restriction on choice-of-law provisions in consumer
transactions to the place where the consumer resides, or the consideration flowing
to the consumer is to be received or used. U.C.C. § 1-301(b) (ALI Council Draft,
Nov. 22, 1999).
146. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 5(2)-(3).
147. It should be noted that by its literal terms, subsection 109(b)(2) only applies when a consumer contract requires delivery of a copy in tangible form. I
have assumed, however, that this language does not mean that there must be a
contract term addressing the issue before subsection 109(b)(2) applies, as the rationale suggests that it is intended to cover situations where in fact a tangible copy
is to be or is delivered without regard to whether there is a contract term requiring such delivery. This also seems to be the only sensible interpretation. Otherwise, software purchased off the shelf containing a license that was silent on the
method of delivery would not come within the rule.
148. UCITA § 109(b)(3) (2000).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. See also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,

supra note 76, § 17.11 (center of gravity approach provides less certainty and
predictability than rigid general rules but its merit is that it gives the place with
the most interest in the problem paramount control over legal issues arising out of
a particular factual context).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 6.
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connections' 5 ' to be considered by the court in determining
the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties, as well as statements about which
jurisdiction's law typically will apply." 2 Similarly, the Rome
Convention creates presumptions as to the jurisdiction whose
law normally will have the closest connection to the transaction.'53 In contrast, subsection 109(b)(3) provides no textual
guidelines to assist the forum in determining what jurisdiction
has the most significant relationship to the transaction. Some
guidance, however, is provided in the comments to section 109.
Comment 4 states that the UCITA rule is similar to the rule of
the Second Restatement, and that cases interpreting the Restatement are applicable.5 4 In addition, that comment provides a nonexclusive list of factors the forum should consider in
applying the rule, which are similar to the factors contained in
sections 6 and 188 of the Second Restatement.' While these
guidelines in the comment are better than no guidelines at all,
they may not be very effective in making up for the lack of
textual guidance. Given a forum's natural tendency to apply its
own law when it has some interest in the transaction, the lack
of textual guidelines may make subsection 109(b)(3) a less
effective means of taking into account the concerns of interested jurisdictions than other, more directed, center of gravity approaches, while, at the same time, creating a higher degree of

151. See, e.g., id. § 188(2).
152. See, e.g., id. § 188(3) (if place of negotiation and place of performance are
in the same state, law of that state usually will apply).
153. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(2) (presumption that contract is
most closely connected with the habitual residence of the party performing the
characteristic performance under the contract).
154. UCITA § 109(b) cmt. 4 (2000).
155. The factors listed are:
(a) place of contracting, (b) place of negotiation, (c) place of performance,
(d) location of the subject matter of the contract, (e) domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of one or both of
the parties, (f) needs of the interstate and international systems, (g)
relative interests of the forum and other interested states in the determination of the particular issue, (h) protection of justified expectations of
the parties, and (i) promotion of certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result.
Id. The only Restatement (Second) contacts not included are the Restatement (Second) section 6 factors of "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law"
and "ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 2, § 6(e)(g).
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uncertainty as to applicable law than is present with those
approaches.
The lack of concern with certainty and predictability evidenced by subsection 109(3)(b) may be explained by a belief
that the parties' planning-related concerns in the non-electronic commerce context are adequately protected by subsection
109(a)'s broad authorization of choice of law by contract. If,
however, the prediction of this Article that the nature of the
"product" involved in software licenses is likely to make contractual choice-of-law provisions less effective with regard to
software licenses than with regard to normal contracts is correct, then that assumption may prove unwarranted.
C. Public Policy Exception for InternationalTransactions
Finally, UCITA subsection 109(c) contains an exception to
the choice-of-law rules applicable in the absence of contractual
choice (and, thus, also an exception to how the consumer contract exception to contractual choice will apply) in international cases. Subsection 109(c) provides that:
In cases governed by [the default rules of] subsection (b), if
the jurisdiction whose law governs is outside the United
States, the law of that jurisdiction governs only if it provides
substantially similar protections and rights to a party not
located in that jurisdiction as are provided under this [Act].
Otherwise, the law of the State that has the most significant
relationship to the transaction governs." 6
Comment 5 states that this rule applies where the default
rules "result in selecting the law of a foreign country and the
law of that country is substantively inappropriate because it
fails to give a party protections substantially similar to those
available under" UCITA' 57 Although the text refers to
protections similar to those under "this Act," the comment
further indicates that the reference is to "contract law," including not only the provisions of UCITA, but also "the general
contract and related equity law of the jurisdiction." 58
This provision seems best described as a public policy

156. UCITA § 109(c).
157.. Id. cmt. 5.
158. Id.
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exception-it allows the forum to refuse to apply the otherwise
applicable law because it finds that law substantively offensive. As discussed in Part III, public policy exceptions devalue
the parties' interest in certainty and predictability. Further, a
public policy exception that applies only in favor of the forum
also devalues the systemic interests in mutual respect and
cooperation, as well as the interests of the jurisdiction whose
law would otherwise apply. Therefore, particularly in the international context, where the greater diversity of law presents
the forum with more occasions on which it may be tempted to
refuse application, the public policy exception should be carefully circumscribed in order to avoid unnecessary uncertainty,
systemic disharmony, and retaliation by other jurisdictions.
Thus, for example, the public policy standard of the Rome
Convention allows the forum to refuse to apply the law otherwise specified by the Convention "only if such application is
manifestly incompatible with the public policy.., of the forum."1 9 Further, even in the context of an authorization to
apply the public policy of another jurisdiction, where systemic
concerns will be favored by the provision, but certainty and
predictability will still be undermined, a high standard is required. Thus, section 187 of the Second Restatement, which
allows the forum to ignore the parties' contractual choice in
favor of the law of the state whose law would apply in the
absence of choice, provides that application of the chosen law
must be "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has
a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue. " "' The comments to the
Restatement state that:
To be "fundamental," a policy must in any event be a substantial one. Except perhaps in the case of contracts relating
to wills, a policy of this sort will rarely be found in a requirement, such as the statute of frauds, that relates to formalities ....Nor is such policy likely to be represented by a rule
tending to become obsolete.., or by general rules of contract
law, such as those concerned with the need for consideration ....On the other hand, a fundamental policy may be
embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of
contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person

159. Rome Convention, supra note 27, art. 16 (emphasis added).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWs, supra note 2, § 187(2)(b).
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against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power.161
The threshold for application of subsection 109(c), however, appears to be very low-the foreign contract law must provide "substantiallysimilarprotections and rights to a party not
located in that jurisdiction" as does UCITA, or that law will
not apply.'62 Just as UCITA's comments attempt to provide
the guidelines for determining the most significant relationship
missing from its text, the comment to subsection 109(c) attempts to supply a more appropriate standard for the application of subsection 109(c). Comment 5 states that: "[C]ourts
should alter the basic rule only in extreme cases. It does not
suffice merely that the foreign law is different. The difference
must be substantial and adverse."'6 3 This standard, however,
does not supplement the text; instead, it seems to directly
contradict it. It suggests that the standard is "substantially
different and adverse," while the textual standard is "not substantially the same."
The comments provide little rationale for subsection
109(c). They describe subsection 109(c), somewhat surprisingly,
as a provision providing "clarity on what law applies in the
absence of an enforceable contract term."" Subsection 109(c),
however, provides just the opposite of clarity. Public policy
exceptions devalue the interest in certainty and predictability
in favor of the forum's interest in controlling the use of its
courts to enforce substantively offensive laws of another jurisdiction. Subsection 109(c) is no exception. Although UCITA applies a bright line default rule in cases of electronic delivery,
the existence of subsection 109(c) means that the parties to an
international transaction cannot rely on that rule in planning
their transaction. Unless the law of the foreign licensor's jurisdiction is "substantially similar" to UCITA with regard to the
licensee's rights, that law will not apply and the parties will be
left with the uncertainty of a most significant relationship test
to pick the U.S. jurisdiction whose law will apply. Similarly, although subsection 109(c) does not apply directly to the parties'
contractual choice of law, it will apply to override that choice

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. cmt. g.
UCITA § 109(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
Id. § 109(c) cmt. 5.
Id. cmt. 1.
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in consumer contracts because of the subsection 109(a) mandatory rules exception, which defers to the default rules of subsections 109(b) and (c). Thus, in international consumer software licensing, a non-U.S. licensor will not be able to rely on
its contractual choice-of-law provision to obtain certainty and
predictability either. Therefore, the cost-reduction philosophy
that underlies the electronic commerce rule of subsection
109(a) is undermined by this provision.
The provision also undercuts the UCITA provisions that
otherwise give some deference to the expectation interests of
the parties and the concerns of interested jurisdictions. In
cases of tangible delivery, the bright line default rule for consumer contracts will not apply if the software is delivered to
another country with laws not substantially similar to UCITA,
thus undermining not only the certainty that rule would otherwise provide, both as a default rule, and as a mandatory rules
exception to the parties' contractual choice of law, but also the
concern it gives to expectation interests and the interests of
the jurisdiction in which the software is delivered. Outside of
the consumer area, the law of the jurisdiction with the most
significant relationship to the contract will not be applied,
despite the fact it has been found to be the most interested
simply because its law is not substantially similar
jurisdiction,
6
to UCITA.' 1
Subsection 109(c) is not on its face either a forum-favoring
or a UCITA favoring provision. 16 If the law chosen is rejected, then "the law of the State that has the most significant
relationship to the transaction governs." That state will not
necessarily be the forum, which means that it may not necessarily be a state that has enacted UCITA. Instead, the state
with the most significant relationship might apply the common
165. It might be argued that the purpose of subsection 109(c) is to protect the
party not located in the foreign jurisdiction from the application of substantively
unfavorable law. This purpose is not supported by the text-which read literally
would deny application of law that gave that party substantially more rights or
protections as well as less-but arguably might be supported by the comment
which indicates that the difference has to be "adverse." If this is the purpose, it is
not served well, for the law that applies instead of the chosen law will only by
happenstance be one more favorable to the party not located in the foreign jurisdiction whose law would otherwise apply.
166. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (adopting a forum-favoring rule by providing that, in
the absence of a choice-of-law agreement, "this Act applies to transactions bearing
an appropriate relation to this state").
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law or U.C.C. Article 2 to the transaction, which means that,
depending on the particular issue involved, the law of the U.S.
jurisdiction ultimately applied might itself not provide substantially similar protections and rights to those contained in
UCITA.
Under either of two assumptions, however, subsection
109(c) could be viewed as a UCITA favoring provision as applied. First, if one assumes that the forum usually will choose
its own law by selecting itself as the U.S. jurisdiction with the
most significant relationship, then the provision would in practice lead to the application of UCITA. Second, if all of the
states adopted UCITA as a uniform law, then the reference to
the law of the state with the most significant relationship
would result in application of UCITA. Neither of these assumptions, however, seems sufficient to form the basis for a choiceof-law rule that will operate with any degree of predictability
to apply UCITA in international transactions.'67
While the benefits to be derived from subsection 109(c)
seem uncertain at best, several features of subsection 109(c)
make it very troubling from a systemic perspective. First, it
only applies to international transactions, even though its
standard requiring substantial similarity could apply to differences between UCITA and non-UCITA U.S. jurisdictions. Second, because that standard is so low, and the provision appears to be mandatory, it will deny application of the law of
the jurisdiction the default rules suggest is the most appropriate jurisdiction in a considerable number of cases, unless the
courts choose to follow the contradictory, but more restrained
test of the comment. Third, because it directs the forum to
then apply the law of the U.S. jurisdiction with the most significant relationship, even though that law too may not be
substantially the same as UCITA, it sends the unfortunate,
and, no doubt, unintended message that any U.S. law, no matter what its substantive content, is better than a foreign law
not substantially similar to UCITA. By ignoring the interests
of interested jurisdictions and the systemic values of mutual

167. First, one must assume that the forum will apply its choice-of-law rules in
good faith and that, therefore, those rules will sometimes lead to application of
the law of another state. Second, although UCITA eventually may be adopted in
all states, as of April 12, 2000, UCITA had been adopted only in Virginia and
Maryland.
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respect and cooperation, subsection 105(c) seems almost custom-made to invite retaliation by foreign fora asked to honor
the parties' choice of U.S. law. The extremely insular philosophy it seems to project thus has the potential to make it a very
disruptive rule within the international choice-of-law system.
D. UCITA's Balancing of Interests
How do the choice-of-law rules of UCITA balance the various interests implicated by choice-of-law decisions? High priority is given to the planning-related interests of the parties, and
particularly the licensor's interest in certainty and predictability in Internet transactions, at least if the licensor is a U.S.
licensor. As discussed above, the primary goal of the choice-oflaw rules applicable to Internet transactions seems to be to
reduce to the absolute minimum the choice-of-law costs of the
licensor engaged in Internet transactions, through a combination of a broad contractual choice-of-law provision and a bright
line default rule selecting the law of the licensor's jurisdiction
in the absence of choice. The other interests given high priority
in the choice-of-law rules applicable to Internet transactions
are those of the forum. The forum can override terms of the
license that conflict with the public policy expressed in its intellectual property laws, although those terms would be valid
under the law selected by the choice-of-law provision in the license. The forum also can refuse to enforce the choice-of-law
provision altogether if it finds it unconscionable. Further, the
forum can refuse to apply the default rule pointing to the law
of the licensor's jurisdiction in an international transaction,
unless that law provides substantially similar protections and
rights to a party (in the case of electronic delivery, almost by
definition, the licensee) not located in that jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the expectation and fairness interests
of parties for whom it is not efficient to engage in choice-of-law
planning, as well as the interests of other jurisdictions are
downplayed. While section 109 authorizes the forum to deny
enforcement to provisions that violate the public policy embodied in its intellectual property laws, no similar provision authorizes consideration of the intellectual property policies of other
interested jurisdictions, either as mandatory rules or as fundamental public policy. Finally, last, and least, in the hierarchy
of interests valued by the UCITA choice-of-law provisions are
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the interests of the international choice-of-law system. Not
only is there little in the rules of section 109 to encourage
mutual respect and cooperation, but the public policy exception
of subsection 109(c) seems to affirmatively invite retaliation by
other jurisdictions.
Outside of the area of electronic delivery of software, the
choice-of-law rules generally follow the heirarchy described
above, but with some significant differences in the particular
weight given the respective interests. The interests of the forum still are highly valued. Its ability to deny enforcement to
the parties contractual choice-of-law provision for unconscionability, to deny enforcement to particular terms based on inconsistency with its intellectual property law policy, and to refuse
to apply the law of another nation does not differ. The lack of
regard for systemic concerns also remains constant in the
physical delivery context. On the other hand, while planning
interests are still highly valued through the broad contractual
choice-of-law provision, outside the area of electronic delivery
of software, the contractual choice of law is unenforceable in
consumer contracts to the extent that it would vary a mandatory rule of the jurisdiction in which the copy of software was
delivered to the consumer. Thus, the expectation and fairness
interests of one significant segment of parties for whom it is
inefficient to take choice-of-law planning into consideration are
valued more highly in relation to the planning interests of
licensors outside of the electronic commerce context. This provision also means that the mandatory consumer rules of an
interested jurisdiction will be honored despite a contrary choice
of law, and, in the absence of an enforceable choice-of-law
provision, the law of that jurisdiction will be selected to govern
the transaction. In addition, the default rule applying outside
of the consumer context authorizes the court to take the interests of other interested jurisdictions into account in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to
the transaction, although the lack of textual guidelines makes
the parameters of this authorization less than clear.
Consider our decompilation hypothetical one last time. The
copyright law of Jurisdiction A provides that licensees may
reproduce the software's object code and translate its form
when the decompilation is necessary to achieve
interoperability, and that this right to decompile cannot be
excluded by contract. The software license prohibits reverse-
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engineering for any purpose. The software license contains a
choice-of-law clause choosing the law of Jurisdiction B. Contract provisions prohibiting reverse-engineering are consistent
with the copyright law of Jurisdiction B. Both licensor and
licensee are nationals of Jurisdiction A. The licensor files suit
in Jurisdiction B for breach of the license after the licensee
decompiles the software in Jurisdiction A. Should Jurisdiction
B apply its own law pursuant to the choice-of-law clause and
enforce the absolute prohibition on reverse-engineering? Or
should it recognize and enforce the mandatory rule of Jurisdiction A prohibiting this type of contract provision? The discussion of this hypothetical in Part IV suggested that in this
case the interests of Jurisdiction A, the only jurisdiction with a
significant interest, and the interests of the choice-of-law system should outweigh the parties' planning interests. Jurisdiction B should honor the mandatory rule of Jurisdiction A.
This may not be the result if Jurisdiction B follows choiceof-law rules like those in UCITA section 109. Subsection 109(a)
directs the court to apply the law chosen by the parties in their
license, unless that law is contrary to the intellectual property
policies of Jurisdiction B. There is no provision authorizing
consideration of other interests outside of the consumer contract context. Further, even if the license were a consumer
contract, the law of Jurisdiction A still may not be applied.
Although subsection 109(a) directs application of the mandatory "rules" of the jurisdiction that would be chosen by the default rules, the clear import of the provision is that the reference is to consumer protection rules. Thus, although the law of
Jurisdiction A probably would apply under the default rules,
one would have to argue that the rule against waiving the
right to decompile is a consumer protection rule before the
mandatory rules exception would apply.
It should be noted, however, that in a real situation involving these facts, the provision preventing decompilation
nevertheless might not be enforced by a jurisdiction applying
the UCITA choice-of-law rules. This result would be reached,
however, not because enforcing the provision would violate the
mandatory rules of Jurisdiction A, but rather because it would
violate the intellectual property policy of JurisdictionB. Jurisdiction B will in a real situation be a U.S. jurisdiction, and
U.S. intellectual property law allows a licensee to decompile
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software in order to achieve interoperability."' The U.S. forum thus may apply the fundamental public policy exception of
UCITA subsection 105(b) to refuse to enforce the contract provision, if it finds that a contract prohibition on decompilation
in a situation where decompilation is allowed under U.S. copyright law would violate it's fundamental public policy.169
Thus, while section 109 probably would not allow the interests
of another jurisdiction to outweigh the parties' planning interests, it would allow the forum's interests to do so.
UCITA may rely too heavily on contractual choice of law to
provide certainty and predictability with regard to choice oflaw rules applicable to software licenses. As UCITA's own
choice-of-law rules demonstrate, the important policy considerations involved with regard to intellectual property are likely
to cause a forum to use public policy and/or mandatory rules to
get around the chosen law when it differs significantly from
the forum's policies. Concomitantly, UCITA does not pay
enough attention to sovereign and systemic interests, which
are implicated to a greater extent in the area of software licensing than they are with regard to other types of contracts.
Yet, in this area, in which the private ordering regime of contract and the strong public policies of intellectual property
intersect, sensitivity to the interests of other jurisdictions and
the international choice-of-law system as a whole may be the
only way ultimately to obtain an acceptable degree of certainty
and predictability both for the parties and for the system.

168. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1999).
[A] person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological measure . .. for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that
are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs, and that have not previously
been readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to
the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute
infringement under this title.
Id.
169. UCITA § 105(b) (2000). Comment 3 to section 105 states that the
decompilation policy "may outweigh a contract term to the contrary." Id. § 105(b)
cmt. 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It has been suggested that the job of choice-of-law rules is:
[T]o provide an intelligible and principled basis for choosing a
substantive rule... over the competing rule of another place.
Rules compete when their application would lead to conflicting results and when the relation of each place to the controversy is such that it is plausible for the rule of either place to
govern. Conflicts law must legitimate the choice. It must
explain70 why rejection of one law in favor of another is
right.
This Article suggests a framework for thinking about what
choice-of-law regime will "legitimate the choice" of a particular
jurisdiction's law over that of another with regard to software
licenses, grounded in a consideration of the interests effected
by choice-of-law rules, and the characteristics of the "commodity" of intellectual property. It suggests that in thinking about
the issue of choice-of-law rules for the contractual aspects of
software licenses, the appropriate starting point is to ask, in
light of the nature of software licenses, what is the appropriate
balance to strike among the interests effected by the rules
chosen? It is hoped that this framework may be of assistance
both to those attempting to design choice-of-law rules in this
area, and to the courts in applying their general contract
choice-of-law rules to this special type of contract.
The ideal solution to the choice-of-law question with regard to software licenses obviously would be for all jurisdictions to have the same substantive law. Then, the choice-of-law
rules would not matter. Given the strong public policies embodied in the intellectual property rules of the various nations
that define the "product" in software licenses, however, total
substantive agreement may be quite difficult to achieve. A
second-best solution would be to reach agreement on a set of
uniform choice-of-law rules. For the same reason, however,
complete agreement on a common set of choice-of-law rules
may be difficult as well.
Perhaps the best that can be hoped for at present is sensitive application of each forum's choice-of-law rules, in light of

170. Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law-State or Federal?, 68 IND. L.J. ,907, 907
(1993) (citations omitted).
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the interests of the parties, the interested jurisdictions, and
the interests of the international choice-of-law system, with the
goal of avoiding serious conflict on a day to day basis and,
perhaps, ultimately facilitating the organic development of at
least some widely-accepted rules. This, too, however, will be no
easy task. As contracts, software licenses implicate the normal
contract-related concerns. Sensitivity must be given to the
planning-related interests of parties who rely on the application of a particular law in planning their transactions, while
protecting the expectation and fairness interests of parties for
whom it is inefficient to engage in choice-of-law planning. In
addition, the interests of jurisdictions in applying their mandatory rules, such as those related to consumer protection, must
be considered. As intellectual property transactions, however,
software licenses implicate another set of interests. The strong
public policies, expressed by an interested jurisdiction's particular balancing of the need to encourage innovation while protecting free access to information embodied in its intellectual
property laws, must be considered. Finally, as international
transactions, the interests of the international choice-of-law
system as a whole also must be kept in mind.
The goal seems clear-the creation of choice-of-law rules
that will allow private ordering by the parties, while respecting
their expectation and fairness interests, the public policy concerns of interested jurisdictions, and the need for mutual respect and cooperation among all jurisdictions in order to foster
systemic harmony, and, ultimately, uniform systemic rules.
The devil is in the details.

